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REEXAMINING 100 YEARS OF SUPREME COURT 
REGULATORY TAKING DOCTRINE: THE. 
PRINCIPLES OF "NOXIOUS USE," "AVERAGE 
RECIPROCITY OF ADVANTAGE," AND "BUNDLE OF 
RIGHTS" FROM MUGLER TO KEYSTONE 
BITUMINOUS COAL 
Thomas A. Hippler* 
The relationship between the takings clause! of the United States 
Constitution's fifth amendment and states' police power2 to legislate 
to provide for the public health, safety and welfare has been the 
source of much confusion among courts and scholars. 3 Confusion 
centers around the questions of when the government can regulate 
* Articles Editor, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author would like to thank Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater and Raymond D. Hiley. My 
initial inquiry into the meaning of Justice Holmes' phrase "average reciprocity of advantage" 
was aided by an unpublished paper written by Lloyd B. Selbst for Professor Plater's Envi-
ronmental Law class at Boston College Law School. 
1 The fifth amendment provides, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. This provision is alternatively known as the 
"just compensation clause." The prohibition applies to the states through the United States 
Constitution's fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). Similar 
requirements are a part of all state constitutions either expressly or by interpretation. See P. 
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1[2] (3d ed. 1980). 
2 The police power has no specific meaning, but at least incorporates those powers possessed 
by the states and not granted to the federal government in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. X. The scope of the police power has expanded greatly in twentieth century juris-
prudence. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977). 
3 Important works include Dunham: Griggs v. Allegany County in Perspective: Thirty Years 
of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63; Michelman, Property Utility 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165 (1967); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, D. BANTA, THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1973) 
[hereinafter BOSSELMAN]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [here-
inafter Sax I]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) 
[hereinafter Sax II]; Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
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land use without compensation under the police power and when the 
regulation amounts to an exercise of the power of eminent domain 
which must be accompanied by just compensation to the owner.4 The 
Supreme Court's treatment of this issue, generally called the "reg-
ulatory taking" issue, has led to confusing and inconsistent decisions. 
Lower courts and scholars have proceeded under alternative theo-
retical approaches, resulting in much uncertainty for land use plan-
ners attempting to accommodate private and public interests. 5 
The rather mystifying nature of regulatory takings jurisprudence 
is in part a result of the Supreme Court's failure to hear almost any 
takings challenges of police power regulation of land use for a period 
of fifty years. An attorney litigating a land use regulatory takings 
claim based on the federal constitution is faced with the problem of 
constructing an argument based in substantial part on cases decided 
before 1930. An examination of these cases is particularly important 
because in the leading case in contemporary regulatory takings ju-
risprudence, Penn Central Transportation v. New York City,6 from 
which the Court is developing a modern "bundle of rights" approach 
to regulatory takings claims, the justices did not agree on the mean-
ing of this precedent. 7 Justice Brennan's majority opinion upholding 
New York City's police power regulation was unable to answer 
satisfactorily questions raised by Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which 
interpreted regulatory takings analysis to revolve around turn-of-
the-century principles of "noxious use" and "average reciprocity of 
advantage. "8 
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court was again unable to 
agree on the application of these principles in rejecting a regulatory 
takings challenge in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. De-
Benedictis. 9 In Keystone Bituminous Coal, Justice Stevens' majority 
opinion contained a major shift in the Court's modern regulatory 
4 The history of the takings clause indicates that this clause was intended to prevent 
arbitrary and tyrannical treatment of property owners by the federal government. Scholars 
agree that the founding fathers did not intend the takings clause to apply to state police power 
regulation, or to any non-physical or non-title interference with private property. Such inter-
pretations of this clause resulted from the passage of the fourteenth amendment and the rapid 
expansion of government action and regulation of private property in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, at 51-138; Sax I, supra note 3, at 57-60. 
See also infra Section 1. 
5 BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, at 322-24. 
6438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
7 See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 231-41 and accompanying text. 
9 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). 
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takings analysis in that it recognized the "noxious use exception" to 
the takings clause which had been advocated by Justice Rehnquist 
in his Penn Central dissent. 10 Yet now-Chief Justice Rehnquist again 
dissented, arguing that based upon the Court's turn of the century 
precedent, the Court should find that this exception was inapplicable 
to the case and that the police power interference with private 
property constituted a taking requiring just compensation for the 
burdened owners.u Consequently, cases from the 1870-1930 time 
period not only form the foundation of the Court's modern analysis, 
they are still central to it. 
The increasing intensity of land use and corresponding rise in the 
value of real property in the United States indicate that new and 
existing types of police power regulation of land use aimed at pro-
tecting the environment and controlling the rate and form of devel-
opment will give rise to more and more regulatory takings claims. 12 
Based upon the interests they represent, attorneys will continue to 
raise the principles of noxious use (or "public nuisance exception")l3 
and average reciprocity of advantage because of the divergent re-
sults these principles encourage. It is also likely that proponents of 
regulation will continue to argue that the substantive due process 
test is the proper mode of examining the constitutionality of police 
power regulation of land use. 14 Unfortunately, while most commen-
tators agree that the inconsistencies of 1870-1930 cases continue to 
be the central problem in regulatory takings analysis, there is a 
dearth of scholarship analyzing in depth cases other than Pennsyl-
vania Coal v. Mahon 15 decided during this period. 
This comment examines the Supreme Court's regulatory takings 
cases of the 1870-1930 time period, focusing on their analytical in-
consistencies and their relationship with each other and with the 
Burger Court's regulatory takings test which was recently modified 
in Keystone Bituminous Coal. With an eye toward the Rehnquist 
Court's future treatment of regulatory takings claims, this comment 
also argues that, in terms of precedent and principle, the Court 
10 See infra notes 301-06 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 311--39 and accompanying text. 
12 See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, at 3-50. 
13 The Penn Central dissent referred to the "noxious use exception" to the takings clause. 
438 U.S. at 145-47. In Keystone Bituminous Coal, both the majority and dissent termed this 
exception the "public nuisance exception." 107 S.Ct. at 1243-46. Both phrases refer to the 
same regulatory takings principle. 
14 See Note, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due 
Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982). 
15 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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should alter its current bundle of rights regulatory takings analysis 
and adopt an approach which focuses on the nature and necessity of 
legislative action. Section I discusses the Supreme Court's doctrine 
before the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. 16 This 
section traces the genesis and development of the principles of nox-
ious use, average reciprocity of advantage, and of "reasonableness" 
or bundle of rights balancing. Section II examines the Pennsylvania 
Coal decision, focusing on its relationship to precedent and the na-
ture of the debate between Justice Holmes' majority opinion and 
Justice Brandeis' dissent.17 Section III discusses the seminal zoning 
case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.,18 again concentrating on its 
relationship with precedent and its implications for later takings 
jurisprudence. 19 Section IV examines the Burger Court's develop-
ment of its bundle of rights takings analysis and focuses in depth on 
Keystone Bituminous Coal, the first major regulatory takings case 
decided by the Rehnquist Court.20 Lastly, section V argues that in 
terms of precedent the Supreme Court's regulatory takings analysis 
is on the wrong track because it fails to balance the public interest 
against the private harm, and suggests the Court modify its ap-
proach, drawing from its current contract clause analysis. 21 
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS THEORY BEFORE PENNSYLVANIA COAL 
The police power, as it was understood in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, was limited in scope and thus thought not to 
conflict with the power of eminent domain, the exercise of which 
required compensation to the property owner.22 The police power 
16 See infra notes 22-142 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 143-80 and accompanying text. 
IR 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
19 See infra notes 181-214 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 215-343 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 344-405 and accompanying text. 
22 The police power was seen as a "protective power" preventing injury to the community, 
while eminent domain involved taking for the public benefit. Appropriate regulation of prop-
erty under the police power was not compensable. See Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 
(1877); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 699 
(1887); Abbott, The Police Power and the Right to Compensation, 3 HARV. L. REV. 188 
(1889); Freund, POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904). See also BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, at 105-23. 
During this time period the legal community believed that any individual burden caused by 
a legitimate exercise of the police power was offset by the benefits the individual gained from 
other uses of that power. Thus, with a proper use of the police power courts required no 
compensation and recognized no injury to the individual owner. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 102 (1851), Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); 
Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. 183, 193, 12 Pick. 184, 194 (1831); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: 
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was thought to encompass only the right of government to interfere 
with private property in two situations: police regulation of property 
which was implicitly limited to preventing common law public nuis-
ances; and in cases of extreme necessity, such as preventing the 
spread of conflagration, in which the general welfare of the public 
was thought to be imperiled and thus thought to override all private 
interests. 23 The distinction between the two aspects of the police 
power is important to an understanding of the development of reg-
ulatory takings doctrine because it ultimately produced the split in 
regulatory takings analysis which has plagued modern courts and 
scholars. 
The economic expansion, population growth, and urbanization 
which occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century created 
social conditions which demanded expansion of government's power 
to interfere with private property.24 These demands were accom-
modated within the police power by expanding both attributes of 
the power. The state's power to prohibit injurious or nuisance uses 
of property was increasingly broadened to allow government to reg-
ulate use which was not a common law nuisance. 25 Additionally, 
during the 1870-1930 period, the requirement that an extreme or 
overriding necessity must exist in order to provide a proper public 
purpose for non-nuisance police power regulation was continually 
deflated to the point where Justice Holmes could argue that the fact 
that legislative action had occurred should be deemed proof that 
such action was necessary for the general welfare and had a proper 
public purpose. 26 The deflation of the requirement of overriding ne-
cessity was accomplished through legal fictions such as certain in-
Why the Takings Test is Still in a Muddle, 57 s. CAL. L. REV. 561, 581-82 (1984), and cases 
cited therein. The principle that general reciprocal benefits offset any burdens made sense, 
however, only where the use of the police power was limited to prohibiting noxious property 
uses, or to appropriation of substantial noninjurious private property interests only during 
war, conflagration, plague, or spreading crop blight, where all property owners are imperiled 
and where private property becomes worthless. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
Given the more intrusive restrictions on private property attempted under the police power 
and upheld by courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became clear 
that the idea of general reciprocal benefits could not justify all uses of the police power when 
challenged as regulatory takings. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
23 Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century 
America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 858-66 (1973). For an example of an "extreme necessity" 
case, see Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1879) (conflagration). 
24 Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century 
America, supra note 23, at 854. 
25 See infra notes 31-75 and accompanying text. 
26 See Tyson Bros. v. Banta, 273 U.S. 418, 445-47 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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dustries that were so large or important that they became "clothed" 
or "affected" with the public interest27 and certain property pos-
sessed such "peculiar conditions" that it also "affected" the public 
interest,28 and thus was the proper subject of police power regula-
tion. 29 A broad examination of the development of these legal fictions 
is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is important to recognize 
the dramatic change in the scope and nature of the police power in 
order to understand the development of Supreme Court regulatory 
takings doctrine in the 1870-1930 period. 30 The development of this 
doctrine is usefully viewed as a reaction to the radically new and 
broadened uses of the police power of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century rather than simply as a shift in judicial interpre-
tation of the takings clause. The important themes of the develop-
ment of the Court's regulatory takings doctrine in response to in-
creased police power action limiting property rights can be traced 
through three lines of cases which were to later clash in Pennsyl-
vania Coal. The cases show that the Supreme Court actually devel-
oped three similar, but independent, regulatory takings analyses. 
A. The Police Power To Prevent Noxious Uses of Property 
One line of cases is {;hat which involved regulatory takings chal-
lenges to government regulation of public nuisance or noxious uses 
of private property. State and local governments' police power to 
prohibit public nuisances predates the United States Constitution.31 
The history of the takings clause indicates that it was not a limit on 
27 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1920); German Alliance Insurance Co. v. 
Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1916); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1912). For a discussion 
of "property affected with a public interest," see Scheiber, The Road to Munn, V PERSPEC-
TIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (1971); Hamilton, Affection with Public Interest, 39 YALE 
L. J. 1089, 1095-99 (1930). 
28 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), Clark v. Nash, 
198 U.S. 361 (1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906). 
29 In other words, there was a proper public purpose for the regulation. 
30 This Comment generally ignores regulatory takings claims in the context of utility rate-
making or regulation of railroads. Although important, these cases involve courts applying 
various legal fictions which significantly alter their takings analysis. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these cases is Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs., 200 U.S. 561 (1906). Also 
important to a complete analysis of regulatory takings is an examination of the change in the 
notion of what "property" is which took place in the 1875-1925 period. See generally Cormack, 
Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (1931); Kratovil & Harrison, 
Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596 (1954). 
31 See, e.g., Acts & Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay (Province Laws, 1692-
1693), c. 23, "An Act for Prevention of Common Nusances [sic] Arising By Slaughter-Houses, 
Still-Houses, &c., Tallow Chandlers, & Curriers .... " 
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the government's common law public nuisance police power.32 Early 
on, legislatures used this power to abate property uses which were 
recognized as common law nuisances. As exercises of the police 
power interfering with private property broadened in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, the extent of this power came increasingly 
into question in the context of fourteenth amendment due process 
clause challenges. 33 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
Court gradually accepted the argument that the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law" mandated that the police power 
must not arbitrarily or discriminatorily interfere with private prop-
erty.34 Thus, the test for this aspect of the due process guarantee, 
32 See supra note 4; infra note 33. 
33 See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1868), Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 
(1885), Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888). The United States Constitution's fourteenth 
amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. 
It is undisputed that, at the time of its adoption, the United States Constitution's takings 
clause and other provision in the Bill of Rights were intended to restrict only the powers of 
the federal government. See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1926) (an interesting account of how James Madison sought 
to bind the states with the Bill of Rights, yet the 1789 Congress explicitly declined this 
approach). In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the United States Supreme 
Court had specifically held that the Bill of Rights was not intended as a limitation on the 
powers of the states. Not surprisingly, with the passage of the fourteenth amendment following 
the Civil War, litigants began to argue that state legislation violated both the privileges and 
immunities clause and the due process clause of that amendment in order to gain federal 
protection of individual rights. Arguments for federal protection based on the privileges and 
immunities clause were unsuccessful. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657-59 (1887); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); 
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 587 (1900). Litigants met with more success in obtaining some 
protection for individual rights under the due process clause. See infra note 34 and accom-
panying text. 
34 In other words, the Supreme Court accepted the argument that "due process of law" had 
a substantive element, it prohibited the states from depriving the individual of the fundamental 
rights of "life, liberty or property" other than in furtherance of a proper public purpose. This 
was very much a "natural law" argument based on courts' duty to protect the fundamental 
rights of man which the United States Constitution and the state constitutions were thought 
to embody. See Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. 
L. REV. 67 (1931). Various forms of this argument had been accepted by a few state courts 
before it found favor in the United States Supreme Court. See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due 
Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 460-79 (1911). Barbier v. 
Connolly, 133 U.S. at 31, is one of the earliest Supreme Court opinions recognizing a sub-
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which became known as substantive due process, developed princi-
pally in the context of police power regulation which prohibited what 
state and local governments deemed noxious uses of property. 35 
The 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas36 is the Supreme Court's first 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between states' police 
power and the due process and takings clauses. Mugler involved an 
act of the Kansas legislature which prohibited the manufacture or 
sale of intoxicating liquors within the state. The appellants, owners 
of breweries, argued that the act diminished the value of their 
property without compensation and thus deprived them of property 
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 37 In other words, the claim 
was that "due process" required that the fifth amendment's takings 
clause apply to the states and required just compensation be paid 
when police power regulations sUbstantially diminish the value of 
private property interests. The Court rejected this claim, reaffirm-
ing the absolute power of states to enact measures which they deem 
necessary and appropriate to protect the public from injurious uses 
of private property: 
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by 
individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, 
the morals, or the safety of the public, is not ... burdened with 
the condition that the State must compensate such individual 
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their 
not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict 
injury upon the community. The exercise of the police power by 
the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or 
the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value 
becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for 
stantive element in the guarantee of "due process oflaw." Before the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment, the Court had reasoned that the phrase "due process of law" in the fifth amend-
ment had its origins in the provision of the Magna Carta guaranteeing deprivation of rights 
only according to "law of the land." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). Thus, the Court had previously held the "due process of 
law" guarantee to constitute only procedures according to pre-existing laws which were 
accepted by the people at the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution, all 
validly enacted laws thereafter, and according to English common law due process rights. Id. 
at 276-77. 
35 Substantive due process also developed in the context of ratemaking cases for utilities 
and railroads, both of which were found to be "affected" or "clothed" with the public interest 
and thus subject to regulation. In these cases, the substantive due process analysis concen-
trated on whether rates had been merely arbitrarily set, or set so low as to amount to a 
confiscation of private property. See infra note 84. 
86 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See Barbier, 113 U.S. at 31, for an earlier discussion of the relation-
ship between the police power and the takings clause. 
37 123 U.S. at 654, 657, 664. 
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public use, or from depriving a person of his propery without 
due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated, 
in the other, unoffending property is taken away from the in-
nocent owner. 38 
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Although Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Mugler does at times 
speak of the police power to protect or promote public well being, it 
is clear that the Court is addressing a legislature's ability to restrict 
injurious or nuisance uses of property.39 Justice Harlan refers to the 
ability to prohibit "noxious use" in recognition of the fact that leg-
islatures' power to declare certain uses to be public nuisances ex-
tends beyond prohibition of what courts have already held to be 
common law nuisances. 4o In Harlan's view, such a determination by 
a state legislature should be shown great deferrence and the extent 
of legislature's power to declare certain private property uses to be 
public nuisances is limited to review under the substantive due 
process and equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment,4l The Mugler Court reasoned that the Kansas act satisfied the 
requirements of substantive due process because it had a "real and 
substantial relation" to the protection of the public health, moral, 
and safety and was not simply an invasion of constitutional rights. 42 
Two subsequent non-land use cases, Powell v. Pennsylvania43 and 
Lawton v. Steele,44 represent the Supreme Court's commitment to, 
and development of, the substantive due process test of regulatory 
takings claims. 45 In Powell, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania act 
which prohibited the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine butter 
for the protection of the public health and to prevent adulteration 
and fraud in the sale of dairy products. 46 Under the act the appellant 
38 I d. at 669. 
39 See id. at 668-69; 657-74. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
40 See id. at 671-72. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851); Dillon, 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 690; Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of 
Property, 9 MINN. L. REV. 593, 612 (1925); Byrne, The Constitutionality of a General Zoning 
Ordinance, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 189, 191 (1927). 
41 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 660-63. 
42Id. at 661-62. 
43 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
44 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
45 The Supreme Court has only recognized that "property," which includes both common 
law personal property and real property, must be taken. See United States v. Security 
Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1982). While it is impossible to simply separate the 
"property" inquiry from the overall regulatory takings analysis, this Comment will not examine 
in depth what is or is not a constitutional property interest. See generally Oakes, "Property 
Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981); B. ACKERMAN, 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). 
46 Powell, 127 U.S. at 679-80. 
" 
, 
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was fined one hundred dollars for selling oleomargarine butter and 
argued that the act deprives him of property without due process of 
law under the fourteenth amendment. 47 The Supreme Court upheld 
the state court's holding that the appellant's offer to prove that his 
oleomargarine butter was wholesome was irrelevant to the issue of 
whether the Act violated the fourteenth amendment. 48 The Powell 
Court simply stated that the wholesomeness of the business of man-
ufacturing oleomargarine was a legislative question.49 As such, the 
Court accorded the legislation the requisite presumption of validity, 
and found that it bore a "real and substantial relation" to its legiti-
mate aim, the protection of public health. 50 This relation was all that 
was required by the fourteenth amendment, and thus the plaintiff 
was not entitled to compensation for the loss of the right to use or 
sell his property validly manufactured before the enactment of the 
law. 51 
Lawton involved aNew York fish preservation statute which de-
clared all fishing equipment aside from hook and line or handrod to 
be a public nuisance which any person could destroy without com-
pensation to the owner. 52 In upholding the law as a valid police power 
exercise, the Supreme Court discussed the limits of the police power 
regulation of private property: 
[the police power] is universally conceded to include everything 
essential to the public safety, health, and morals and to justify 
the destruction or abatement of whatever may be regarded as a 
public nuisance ... the State may interfere wherever the public 
interests demand it, and in this particular [sic] a large discretion 
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only 
what the interests of the public require, but what measures are 
necessary for the protection of such interests. 53 
The Lawton Court then set out the classic statement of the proper 
public ends-reasonable means-substantive due process test: 
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of 
the public it must appear, first, that the interests of the public 
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re-
quire such interference; and, second, that the means are reason-
47 [d. at 682-83. 
48 [d. at 681-83; 684-86. 
49 [d. at 684-85. 
50 [d. at 684-87. 
51 [d. at 687. See also id. at 698-99 (Field, J., dissenting). 
52 Lawton, 152 U.S. at 135. 
53 [d. at 136. 
1987] REGULATORY TAKINGS 
ably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not 
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 54 
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Although, like the Mugler opinion, Lawton can be read as encom-
passing an unfettered police power which extends beyond prohibiting 
only harmful private property use, the Court goes on to distinguish 
cases which involved invalid police power exercises, reasoning that 
they involved "a practical inhibition of occupations harmless in them-
selves which might be carried on without detriment to the public 
interests. "55 The Lawton Court also reasoned that, although it must 
be given much discretion, "the legislature has no right to declare 
that to be a nuisance which is clearly not SO."56 Lawton and Powell 
are best viewed as extentions of the Mugler doctrine which viewed 
substantive due process as a limit on a legislature's power to regu-
late, but ultimately allowed legislatures to prohibit nuisance or near-
nuisance use of private property unfettered by the takings clause. 57 
The disenfranchised property interest in all three cases was judged 
by a state legislature to be injurious to the public, and the Supreme 
Court was willing to uphold the legislative judgment and means in 
all three cases as reasonable. All three Courts believed that the sole 
regulatory taking constitutional test of a state police power regula-
tion is whether an individual has been deprived of property without 
substantive due process. 
The case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles,58 in which the Supreme Court 
invalidated an exercise of the police power, is important to an anal-
ysis of regulatory takings because it indicates the limits of legisla-
tures' police power. Dobbins involved two ordinances adopted by the 
city council of Los Angeles. The first ordinance set the boundaries 
of the district where gasworks could be constructed. 59 Pursuant to 
the ordinance, the appellant had contracted to construct gasworks, 
purchased property, obtained a permit and constructed the founda-
tions of the works. 60 The city council then passed a second ordinance 
which limited the boundaries of the district and by doing so made it 
unlawful for the appellant to construct her gasworks. 61 The Dobbins 
54 [d. at 137. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594-95 (1962). 
55 Lawton, 152 U.S. at 138. 
56 [d. at 140. 
57 See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658-69; Powell, 127 U.S. at 684-87; Lawton, 152 U.S. at 138-
39. 
58 195 U.S. 223 (1904). 
59 [d. at 224. Dobbins actually involved a rudimentary zoning ordinance. 
60 [d. at 224, 238. 
61 [d. at 225. 
, 
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Court reasoned that despite the impairment of the appellant's prop-
erty rights, the police power ordinance would be valid if the gas-
works' operation or the changed character of the community made 
the prohibition necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
pUblic. 62 However, based on the demurrer to the facts, the Court 
assumed that the gasworks would be constructed so as to not inter-
fere with the public health and safety, its operation was not incom-
patible with the surrounding land use, and community conditions 
had not changed. 63 The Dobbins Court was not willing to allow the 
city council to declare a compatible use of property to be a public 
nuisance. Accordingly, it held that the ordinance was not necessary 
to protect the public and thus was an "arbitrary and discriminatory 
exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property 
without due process of law and an impairment of property rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion."64 In other words, a regulatory taking was found using the 
Lawton ends-means substantive due process test. 65 
Increasingly the theme of changed community conditions was re-
lied upon by the Court to uphold noxious use police power restric-
tions of private property uses. 66 The case of Reinman v. Little Rock67 
involved a city ordinance that closed an established livery stable as 
a noxious or nuisance use. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance 
as reasonable in light of the changed nature of surrounding uses. 68 
Although the livery stables were now practically worthless, no com-
pensation was constitutionally required. Similarly, in Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian69 the Court upheld a city ordinance closing a brickyard, 
causing a decline in the value of the affected property from $800,000 
to $60,000. Despite the fact that the property was originally located 
62 Id. at 238. 
6a Id. at 238-40. 
64 Id. at 241. Justice Brennan, apparently joined by a plurality of justices, has recently 
advanced a similar view in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651-
53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
65 Provided that the government sought only to use the police power to prohibit a noxious 
use or abate a nuisance only, the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test had to be 
satisfied. However, under the guise of abating a public nuisance, property could not be 
"appropriated to public use" by the police power. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 396-400 
(1895). In other words, just compensation was required if the police power was used not only 
to abate the public nuisance, but to take title and improve the property for resale by the state 
or for use as public property. See id. 
6(; See Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REV. 835, 841 (1924). 
67 237 U.S. 171 (1915). 
68 Id. at 176-78. 
69 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
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outside city limits and had been operated as a brickyard for a number 
of years, the Court found that the prohibition of brickmaking as a 
nuisance or noxious use was not arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory 
and thus the Constitution did n'ot require that just compensation be 
paid to the brickyard owner.70 Reinman and Hadacheck are impor-
tant because they demonstrate the expansion in scope of the police 
power to prevent public nuisances. 71 The cases rest on the idea that 
a certain land use with spillover effects can become a public nuisance 
when it is no longer compatible with the surrounding uses and that, 
if a legislature finds the land use to be noxious, the use can be abated 
despite the detrimental impact on the individual. 72 
In sum, the noxious use line of cases demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court viewed the fourteenth amendment guarantee against 
the deprivation of property without due process of law as mandating 
a substantive due process test. The fifth amendment guarantee 
against the taking of property without just compensation was incor-
porated into this test in the sense that a police power regulation 
which failed the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test 
constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property without 
compensation. Where the police power was being used to regulate 
private property interests or uses because they were injurious to 
the health, safety, and welfare of other individuals, the takings 
clause principle of protection of private property rights was effec-
tuated only by requiring the government regulation be reasonably 
necessary to prevent a noxious use and not be an unnecessary in-
terference with private property. 73 
Proponents of property regulation used the label of noxious use 
regulation to justify increasingly restrictive regulation of property 
interests which were not common law nuisances. Yet, the Supreme 
70 [d. at 41O-1l. 
71 Along with Dobbins, Reinman and H adacheck also demonstrate the inability of the public 
nuisance police power to accommodate the required land use management desires of local 
government and the Court attempting to fit what was obviously new and necessary land use 
control within its traditional concepts. 
72 See Hadachek, 239 U.S. at 410. Other cases which involved changing community condi-
tions justifying the use of the police power to prevent public nuisances include: St. Louis 
Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919) (billboard prohibition upheld as 
reasonable because it discourages thieves, prostitutes, derelicts, etc.); Thomas Cusack Co. v. 
Chicago, 247 U.S. 526 (1917) (ordinance prohibiting billboards upheld as reasonable as a 
prohibition of negative impacts on neighborhood, including aesthetics); Murphy v. California, 
225 U.S. 623 (1912) (ordinance prohibiting billiard hall as harmful to the public upheld). 
73 The "not unduly oppressive" aspect of the Lawton ends-means substantive due process 
test was not interpreted by the Court as mandating a least restrictive means analysis in any 
of these noxious use cases. See Hadachek, 239 U.S. at 413-14. 
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Court was very reluctant to interfere with this traditional use of 
police power. Thus, in almost every case the Court gave much de-
ference to any legislative judgment and upheld the regulation of uses 
which state and local governments found to be noxious. 74 Yet, Dob-
bins and dicta from other cases indicate that some legislative or 
judicial finding of endangerment to the public or incompatibility with 
other uses had to support classification and abatement of a particular 
use as noxious or a public nuisance. The absolute nature of an ex-
ercise of the police power to prevent noxious uses of property was 
never questioned. 75 If valid under the Court's ends-means substan-
tive due process test, the use of the police power did not take 
property in violation of the United States Constitution. 
B. Police Power Interference with Private Property to Improve the 
Public Condition: The Roots of the Bundle of Rights Analysis 
A review of Supreme Court regulatory takings jurisprudence re-
veals a second type of police power regulatory takings analysis de-
veloping out of the more intrusive uses of state police power in the 
1870-1930 period. While the legislature's ability to use its police 
74 See Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1910). 
75 In Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916), a unanimous Supreme 
Court upheld an act which declared the emitting of smoke within certain city limits to be a 
public nuisance. Justice Day reasoned: 
So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, we have no doubt the State may by 
itself or through authorized municipalities declare the emission of dense smoke in 
cities or populous neighborhoods a nuisance and subject to restraint as such; and that 
the harshness of such legislation, or its effect upon business interests, short of a 
merely arbitrary enactment, are not valid constitutional objections. Nor is there any 
valid Federal constitutional objection in the fact that the regulation may require the 
discontinuance of the use of property or subject the occupant to large expense in 
complying with the terms of the law or ordinance. 
Id. at 492. See also Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658 ("The acknowledged police power of a State 
extends often to the destruction of property. A nuisance may be abated. Everything prejudicial 
to the health or morals of a city may be removed." (quoting Justice McLean's opinion in the 
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 513, 532 (1846»); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitation 
Reduction Workers, 199 U.S. 306, 324-25 (1905) ("the clause prohibiting the taking of private 
property without compensation is not intended as a limitation of those police powers which 
are necessary to the tranquillity of any well-ordered community, nor of that general power 
over private property which is necessary for the orderly exercise of all governments. It has 
always been held that the legislature may make police regulations, although they may interfere 
with the full enjoyment of private property, and though no compensation is made."); Hada-
check, 239 U.S. at 410 ("It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most 
essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may indeed seem harsh in 
its exercise, usually is on some individuals, but the imperative necessity for its existence 
precludes any limitation upon it when not exercised arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be 
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining."). 
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power to prohibit public nuisances was considered to be absolute, in 
the years following the enactment of the fourteenth amendment the 
Supreme Court became increasingly wary of, and sought to limit, 
uncompensated government interference with innocent, noninjurious 
uses of private property. 76 
The Supreme Court first attacked this interference in the context 
of inverse condemnation claims resulting from government propri-
etaryaction. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,n the Court held that 
the owner of land was entitled to just compensation when his prop-
erty was flooded after the government-authorized construction of a 
dam caused a rise in the water level of a lake. 78 The Pumpelly Court 
reasoned that when private property is physically invaded to a sub-
stantial extent by government action, the government is required 
to use the power of eminent domain. 79 For the next thirty years the 
Supreme Court's view continued to be that a-1!}lYlSicalinvasion was 
required before a landowner would be entitled to just compensation, 
and that any consequential or incidental damages resulting from 
government action were strictly noncompensible. 80 
The case of Richards v. Washington Terminal Company,81 which 
was decided forty years after Pumpelly, shows how the just com-
pensation requirement further expanded in a manner which brought 
it into conflict with police power regulations. Richards involved a 
property owner whose land was located next to a railroad tunnel 
that was equipped with a fan that blew out smoke and fumes. The 
railroad was operated by a private company under congressional 
authorization. The Supreme Court held that Congress could legalize 
what would otherwise be a public nuisance, but it could not confer 
immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as 
to amount, in effect, to a taking of private property for public use. 82 
76 While this section deals with the application of the takings clause to state police power 
exercises, the reader should note that the Supreme Court first held that the takings clause 
guarantee of just compensation for private property taken for public use applies to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of law in the context of an 1897 
case reviewing a state exercise of eminent domain. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226, 235-36 (1897). In Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., the Supreme Court's holding is based on a 
natural law rationale rather than a historical incorporation argument. See id. 
7780 U.S. 166 (1871). 
78Id. at 177. 
79 I d. at 181. 
80 See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 
445 (1903); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904). See generally BOSSELMAN, supra 
note 3, at 105-14; Cormack, supra note 30. 
81 233 U.S. 546 (1914). 
82Id. at 553. 
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The operation of the railroad affected the plaintiff's property with 
such direct, peculiar and substantial damages as to diminish its value 
to an extent which required compensation.83 Pumpelly and Richards 
arose out of government agents' failure to use their delegated powers 
of eminent domain to condemn all property affected by their opera-
tions that furthered the public interest. These two cases represent 
the breakdown of the requirement that an appropriation of title is 
necessary to effect a taking. In addition, these cases stand for the 
broader principle that the takings clause requires compensation for 
innocent owners whose non-noxious property interests are actually 
or effectively appropriated by government action to increase the 
general welfare. A number of pre-Pennsylvania Coal police power 
regulation cases share this theme. 84 While a detailed examination of 
>l3 Id. at 556-57. 
84 See Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); Martin v. District of 
Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139 (1907), Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs., 200 U.S. 
561 (1906), Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (McKenna J., dissenting). See also E. FREUND, 
POLICE POWER 510 (1904); Note, 27 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1912); Hall and Wigmore, Compen-
sation for Property Destroyed To Stop the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L. REV. 501 
(1907) (advocating compensation for private property destroyed to prevent the spread of a 
conflagration); Vance, The Road to C01(iiscation, 25 YALE L.J. 285 (1916). 
Police power regulation of non-noxious property interest was allowed by the Court under 
two different rationales. On the one hand, the Court disregarded the implicit end of regulation 
as preventing nuisances or near nuisances and countenanced the increased regulation of non-
noxious private property interests by reasoning that the police power encompassed the power 
to regulate to promote the "public convenience." See Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) 
(the police power "is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or 
unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the State as to bring 
out of them the greatest welfare of the people."). On the other hand, the Court allowed the 
transformation of the judicial requirement of "public necessity" as providing the proper public 
purpose for police power regulation. By finding geographical areas possessing "peculiar con-
ditions affecting the public interest," and certain businesses providing such a public function 
or service that they were "affected" or "clothed" with the public interest, the Court found 
more and more regulation to be justified by "necessity" and thus within the scope of the police 
power. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. In combination, these two trends 
produced a new judicial view of a broad police power which frequently appropriated non-
noxious private property interests through regulation because the nature of the property 
usually was found to implicate the public interest. But see Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 
412-14 (no public interest in private deed reserving rights); Tyson Bros. v. Banta, 273 U.S. 
418 (1927) (no public interest in the price of theater tickets). 
However, as the requirement of extreme public necessity as the justification for depriving 
the individual of non-noxious private property broke down and new and greater restrictions 
on private property were attempted under the police power, the Court began to view the 
takings clause as a limitation on the use of the police power in lieu of the power of eminent 
domain. In the context of utility ratemaking cases, the Court added the requirement that 
police power regulation of property which was not a public nuisance could not amount to a 
"practical destruction" or "confiscation" of that property. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 397 (1894); Smyth v .. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 525-26 (1898); Knoxville 
v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1909) and cases cited therein. 
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dicta would not be meaningful, at least three land use cases which 
focus on the development of the conflict of the proper role of eminent 
domain and of the police power deserve mention. 
The case of Curtin v. Benson85 concerned regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary of the Interior that addressed the problem of herds 
of cattle roaming around the park. The regulations attempted to 
solve this problem by prohibiting the grazing of cattle on private 
lands within Yosemite Park. Apparently, at this time such grazing 
was regarded as the primary, if not only, practical use of these lands. 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the federal gov-
ernment had the power to regulate private lands. The unanimous 
Court did not explicitly decide this question because it held that, 
assuming the United States had power over these private lands 
either as sovereign or proprietor, the regulations were nevertheless 
ultra vires because they destroyed the essential use of private prop-
erty.86 Justice McKenna reasoned: 
[the] order is not ... a regulation of the use of the land, as an 
order to fence the lands might be, but is an absolute prohibition 
of use. It is not a prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the 
prevention of a legal and essential use, an attribute of its own-
ership, one which goes to make up its essence and value. To take 
it away is practically to take his property away, and to do that 
is beyond the power of sovereignty, except by proper proceed-
ings to that end. 87 
Thus, the Curtin Court held that the end sought to be accomplished 
by the regulations, prohibition of a significant non-noxious use of the 
land, could be obtained only through the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain. 
Similarly, in Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas COrp.,88 the Court 
struck down a city ordinance which required a franchised utility to 
remove its poles and wires as necessary in order to aid the construc-
tion of a new municipal system. The Court rejected any noxious use 
justification for the regulation, reasoning that the company's facili-
ties posed no threat to the public. 89 Similarly, the Court rejected the 
argument that extreme or overriding necessity might justify uncom-
pensated interference with private property under the police power, 
reasoning that there was "no real public necessity" for constructing 
85 222 u.s. 78 (1911). 
86Id. at 86-87. 
87Id. at 86. See infra note 322 and accompanying text. 
88 251 U.S. 32 (1919). 
8·Id. at 38. 
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a new city-owned system. 90 Although the city had the right to erect 
a system of its own, it could not violate the company's franchise 
rights, nor compel it to aid in the endeavor, without compensating 
the utility: 
[w]e are not concerned with the duty of the corporation operating 
a public utility to yield uncompensated obedience to a police 
measure adopted for the protection of the public, but with a 
proposed uncompensated taking or disturbance of what belongs 
to one lighting system in order to make way for another. And 
this the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. 91 
Like the Curtin Court, the Los Angeles Gas Corp. Court invalidated 
a police power regulation which substantially interfered with private 
uses that did not constitute public nuisances. Although their reason-
ing is not entirely consistent, both Courts held that due process of 
law would not permit the prohibition of property uses not conflicting 
with the public interest. 92 Such interference was a taking of private 
property without due process of law. 
However, in Block v. Hirsh93 the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
rent control statute which sUbstantially interfered with a noninju-
rious use of private property. Block concerned an act of Congress 
which addressed the rental housing shortage in the District of Co-
lumbia resulting from the World War I effort. 94 The act "cut down" 
the landowner's property and contract rights by allowing tenants to 
remain in their apartments at the rent they had been paying, unless 
modified by a rent board. 95 The Act was challenged under the fifth 
amendment by a landowner who desired to use a previously rented 
room for his own residential purposes rather than renew his tenant's 
expired lease. 96 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 40. Thus, apparently by 1919 the Supreme Court believed that the takings clause 
did impose some substantive limits on states' police powers because the clause was held to be 
part of "due process." But see supra note 75. 
92 The Los Angeles Gas Corp. Court's analysis has much in common with the enterprise-
arbiter theory later advanced by Professor Joseph Sax. Compare 251 U.S. at 38-40; Sax I, 
supra note 3, at 61-70. 
93 256 U.S. 135 (1921). In Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921), 
the Supreme Court also reasoned that the Block analysis applied to state rent control laws. 
See also Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 246-50 (1922). 
94 Block, 256 U.S. at 153-54. 
95Id. at 157. 
96 Id. at 154. Under the Act, the owner did have the right to possession "for actual and 
bona fide occupancy by himself, or his wife, children, or dependents ... upon giving thirty 
days' notice in writing." Apparently, Hirsh did want the premises for his own use, but did 
not provide thirty days notice because he denied the validity of the Act. Id. 
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Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes reasoned that the public 
interest was implicated because housing is a necessity of life, space 
in Washington was monopolized in comparatively few hands, and the 
existing condition caused by the federal government's war effort was 
dangerous to public health. 97 In other words, this interference with 
a noninjurious use of private property did have a public purpose 
because the extreme situation affected the public interest. 98 As with 
the old conflagration or wartime cases, "public necessity" was found 
to permit regulation which significantly burdened owners of non-
noxious private property. 99 
Yet, Justice Holmes further reasoned that such a police power 
regulation could go "too far" and amount to a taking without due 
process of law. 100 In the case at issue, the statute did not go "too 
far" because it was only a temporary measure and provided the 
landlord a reasonable rent. lOI The Block Court, in effect, held that 
police power regulation of noninjurious use of private property is 
constitutionally permissable if the regulation is reasonable and ad-
dresses a public exigency. Factors which go to establishing the rea-
sonableness of the regulation are the diminution in value and 
whether the regulation provides an economic use to the owner, and 
the duration and extent of the redefinition of legal property rights. 102 
Contrary to the suggestion of some modern commentators, prior 
to Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon the Supreme Court struggled with 
and accepted the principle that the takings clause limits police power 
regulation of private property. The Court realized that where the 
police power is being used to solve a public problem, or to increase 
the public welfare, by redistributing to the public private property 
interests that are compatible with surrounding uses to the public, a 
clear conflict with the takings clause can develop.103 The Court was 
not willing to allow the use of the police power for the purpose of 
significantly redistributing noninjurious private property rights to 
the pUblic. However, under its reasonableness balancing approach, 
the Court would uphold reasonable regulations addressed to public 
exigencies despite the fact that regulation did take some private 
property uses or interests for public use. Thus, where the police 
97 [d. at 156. 
98 [d. at 155-56. 
99 See supra notes 22, 84. 
100 Block, 256 U.S. at 156. 
101 [d. at 156-57. 
102 [d. at 157-58. 
103 See id. at 156. 
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power was being used to regulate land use which could not be 
prohibited as a public nuisance, the Supreme Court effectuated the 
takings clause guarantee of individual property rights with a rea-
sonableness analysis, rather than strictly a Lawton ends-means sub-
stantive due process approach. 104 The reasonableness balancing test 
examines the magnitude of the burden to the property owner's in-
terest, and therefore parallels the approach to inverse condemnation 
cases such as Pumpelly and Richards. 105 The Court was not willing 
to find a taking unless a substantial degree of invasion or diminution 
in value was shown. In addition, the Block reasonableness balancing 
test weighs the magnitude of the burden to the individual against 
the benefit to the public interest.106 Although the reasonableness 
balancing test applied only to non-noxious use cases, it is the fore-
runner of the Court's modern "bundle of rights" approach to all 
regulatory takings claims. 107 
C. The Principle of Average ReciproC'ity of Advantage As a 
Valida tor of Police Power Impairment of Private Property Rights 
to Improve Public Welfare. 
The Supreme Court's pre-Pennsylvania Coal regulatory takings 
decisions also recognized another category of cases in which the 
police power was exercised to appropriate non-noxious private prop-
erty rights. These cases involved the use of the police power to 
actively promote private economic expansion. The cases rested on 
104 This "reasonableness" test is not the Lawton ends-means substantive due process rea-
sonable means analysis. See supra note 106; Humbuck, A Unifying Theory for the Just-
Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 274-
75 (1982). But see Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1065. 
105 In the public welfare regulation cases, the regulatory interference caused by the police 
power could be analyzed in a manner similar to inverse condemnation cases, such as Pumpelly 
and Richards, where the interference is caused by government enterprises. In both these 
types of cases, the government is burdening private property interests or uses thought to be 
compatible with surrounding uses and noninjurious in themselves. On the other hand, police 
power regulation of noxious uses for private property demanded an alternative analysis 
because the regulated use of the private property was the direct cause of the public problem. 
106 See Block, 256 U.S. at 156-57; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415-16 
(1922). This second element of the Block reasonableness test makes the test very similar to 
the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test used for police power regulations of 
noxious uses. However, at least theoretically, the Block reasonableness test is more restrictive 
than the ends-means substantive due process test because while the latter test presupposes 
an absolute police power to achieve proper ends, under the reasonableness test the magnitude 
of the burden to the individual owner alone could constitute a taking even if the burden is 
necessary to achieve the government ends. 
107 See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text. 
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the idea that the regulation provides an average reciprocity of ad-
vantage - the reciprocal benefits flowing to the burdened party as a 
result of the regulation make it fair under the circumstances for a 
few individuals to bear the entire burden of the regulation. Like the 
Block reasonableness test, this principle was developed by the Su-
preme Court in order to uphold police power regulation without 
compensation because the regulations were thought to be reason-
able. 
Justice Holmes appears to have originated the phrase "average 
reciprocity of advantage" in Jackman v. Rosenbaum CO.,108 and he 
explicitly recognized this principle as part of the constitutional reg-
ulatory takings test in that case and in Pennsylvania Coal v. Ma-
hon.109 Unfortunately, his presentation of the theory in both cases 
was brief and rather nebulous. no Justice Holmes defined average 
reciprocity of advantage in these two cases by using precedent. We 
must therefore look to the earlier caselaw in order to define the role 
of this principle in the constitutional regulatory takings test. 
Wurts v. Hoagland,lll which is cited in Jackman, is an early 
reciprocity of advantage case. In Wurts, the Supreme Court held 
108 260 U.S. 22 (1922). 
109 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
110 As a result of Justice Holmes' nebulous presentation of the principle of average reciprocity 
of advantage, and the fact that the principle seemed to disappear from the Supreme Court's 
regulatory takings analysis until raised by the Penn Central Transportation dissent, modern 
commentators have not agreed on the precise meaning of Holmes' phrase. Compare Heyman 
& Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban 
Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1129 n.47 (1964) (the phrase 
means correlative benefit, and to Justice Holmes, but not Justice Brandeis, it meant some 
special kind of return not enjoyed by the community at large); Oakes, "Property Rights" In 
Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 604 (1981) (the phrase was Holmes' 
way of saying that a public interest existed); D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 21 (1982) ("A 
zoning ordinance illustrates a land use ordinance conferring an average reciprocity of advan-
tage. All the land within a residential district is burdened by the residential land use restric-
tion, but all the land is also benefitted. All property owners within the district suffer the 
burden but gain from the benefit because all of the l~nd is equally restricted. Benefits cancel 
burdens. There is no taking."); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Test is Still in 
a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 581-82 (1984) (Holmes was referring to the traditional 
principle that justified police power regulation always produces reciprocal benefits which 
implicitly compensate all owners); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The 
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1971) (as coined by 
Justice Brandeis, the phrase assumes a system of reciprocal duties and benefits between 
individual property owners and implicitly regards the constitutional mandate for just compen-
sation as satisfied in non-monetary form-the owner is compensated for losses sustained in 
regulation by sharing in the general benefits which regulations secure). See also Van Alstyne, 
Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospect7ts, 8 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1, 
18 (1967). 
III 114 U.S. 606 (1885). 
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that aNew Jersey law providing for the common drainage of any 
tract of marsh land upon application of at least five owners of sepa-
rate lots in the tract did not deprive any of the owners of their 
property without due process of law. The Court reasoned: 
[i]t is the power of the government to prescribe public regula-
tions for the better and more economical management of prop-
erty of persons whose property adjoins, or which . . . can be 
better managed and improved by some joint operation. The prin-
ciple ... is, to make an improvement common to all concerned, 
at the common expense of all. 112 
Thus, Wurts stands for the principle that the police power can be 
used to force unwilling owners to surrender property interests and 
join in a mutual development scheme because the owners themselves 
will share equally in the benefits of any development. 113 The peculiar 
nature of the marsh lands was thought to necessitate government 
involvement, or in other words, to implicate the public interest. 
Commenting that this principle has long been maintained by the 
courts of New Jersey, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that this 
proper (and uncompensated) exercise of police power did not derive 
from the power of taking private property for the public use under 
the right of eminent domain or the (police) power to suppress a 
nuisance dangerous to the public health. 114 Rather, it derived from 
the police power to regulate when necessary to further the general 
welfare. 115 
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,116 a second reciprocity of 
advantage case cited by Justice Holmes in Jackman, concerned a 
California Act which assessed property owners, but not non-owners, 
within a district for the cost of an irrigation system to improve arid 
lands within that district. Using essentially the same rationale as 
Wurts, the Supreme Court held that the act was a valid police power 
regulation with a legitimate public use and did not unconstitutionally 
deprive land owners of their property.117 The Court noted that, 
"[s]tatutes authorizing drainage of swamp lands have frequently 
been upheld independently of any effect upon the public health, as 
reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are 
112Id. at 615. 
113 Id. at 611-12. See also Head v. Amoskeag, 113 U.S. 9, 22 (1884). 
114 Id. at 614. 
115 Wurts, 114 U.S. at 114. 
116 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
117 Id. at 160-64. 
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treated for this purpose as owners of a common property. "118 The 
Court reasoned that this principle applied to regulations setting up 
irrigation districts for arid lands. 119 Again the principle is that the 
police power can be used to force economic development of a private 
property interest where such development is required for the benefit 
of the surrounding property interests and where such development 
in turn increases the value of the owner's property. 
Thus, the line of cases Justice Holmes later characterized as rest-
ing on average reciprocity of advantage developed in the context of 
land use regulation of certain extreme lands. In certain areas prop-
erty rights were thought so interdependent that all private property 
use affected the public interest. There the criteria of necessity was 
held to be satisfied, thus there was a public purpose, and the police 
power could be used to compel owners to surrender noninjurious 
property interests and participate in common development. Owners 
were usually paid compensation for the land actually used for irri-
gation or drainage ditches. 120 Compensation was not constitutionally 
required because the improvements to private property provided by 
the exercise of the police power offset the appropriation of a forced 
share contribution and the loss of property rights. However, if an 
owner in an appropriation district showed that he or she did not 
share in the common improvements, the exercise of the police power 
was invalid as depriving the owner of property without due process 
of law. 121 
Justice Holmes himself applied the reciprocal benefits principle in 
an appropriation scheme outside of land use regulation in Noble State 
Bank v. Haskell. 122 In Noble State Bank the Supreme Court upheld 
as valid an Oklahoma act which created a state Depositors' Guaranty 
Fund, which was funded by an assessment of one percent of banks' 
average daily deposits. The plaintiff bank asserted that because it 
118Id. at 163. The Supreme Court further reasoned: "In such a case the absolute right of 
each individual owner of land must yield to a certain extent or be modified by corresponding 
rights on the part of other owners for what is declared upon the whole to be for the public 
benefit." I d. 
119 ld. at 163-64. The Court also reasoned that, as in drainage cases, irrespective of the fact 
that some parcels may receive greater benefits from the scheme, all parcels situated so as to 
be benefitted by the project could be assessed. ld. at 163-64. 
120 See generally Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Schofield, Power of Illinois, Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to Aid Owners of Wet Lands to Drain Them for Agricultural 
Purposes, 1 ILL. L. REV. 116 (1906). 
121 See Fallbrook Irrigation District, 164 U.S. at 163-64; Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage 
District, 239 U.S. 478 U916); Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55 (1916); 
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Imp. Dist. No.6, 256 U.S. 658 (1920). 
122 219 U.S. 104 (1911). 
676 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:653 
was solvent and did not want the help of the Guaranty Fund, the 
assessment took private property for private use and thus deprived 
it of property without due process of law. Writing for a unanimous 
court, Justice Holmes rejected this argument, reasoning that a public 
purpose existed because an ulterior public advantage may justify a 
comparatively insignificant taking of private property for a private 
use. 123 Justice Holmes reasoned further that the share of each party 
in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection may be sufficient 
compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled to as-
sume. 124 Holmes found that the fund was a reasonable use of police 
power both because the fund had a public purpose in that it ulti-
mately promoted the public welfare by safeguards for the banking 
public and because it had a mutual compulsory benefit for the banks 
themselves. 125 
A 1916 case, Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania,126 is the one average 
reciprocity of advantage precedent cited by Justice Holmes in Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon. Pennsylvania's Barrier Pillar Actl27 re-
quired that the owners of adjoining coal mines were each required 
to leave a pillar (or wall) of sufficient width to prevent floods which 
were produced when mines were abandoned and allowed to fill with 
water. The defendant Plymouth Coal Company refused to leave any 
pillar barrier between its workings and those of the adjacent coal 
mine. The defendant argued that such a pillar was unnecessary and 
that the act was unconstitutional because it took property without 
just compensation in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 128 The Penn-
sylvania court129 held that although the act did work an appropriation 
of property rights it was nevertheless a valid exercise of police power 
because it was intended to prevent mineowners from using their 
123 Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. at 110. Here Justice Holmes was addressing the appellant's 
claim that no proper public purpose existed. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have so 
expanded permissible public purposes that this type of argument is unlikely to be successful. 
See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
124 Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. at 111. See also Ohio v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). 
125 Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. at 111-12. 
126 232 Pa. 141 (1911), a/I'd, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). 
127 Act of June 2, 1891, art. III, sec. 10, P.L. 176. 
128 Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, 232 Pa. at 144. 
129 In Plymouth Coal Company, the United States Supreme Court considered only proce-
dural due process and equal protection clause issues. Justice Holmes' use of Plymouth Coal 
Company in his Pennsylvania Coal opinion refers to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's two 
alternative holdings in Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, 232 Pa. 141 (1911) (the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds of the opinion below by Judge Ferris). 
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property to injure the rights of others and to protect miners from 
the dangers of flooding, and because protection of such a large class 
of individuals constituted protection of public safety. 130 Alternatively, 
the court reasoned an exercise of police power may burden a specified 
class, if in achieving the public interest, the regulation protects alike 
the interests of, or generates specific benefits for, the burdened 
class. 131 Here: 
the rib of solid coal not to be mined into by either of the adjoining 
owners was to be contributed by each in equal parts for the 
mutual benefit of each .... This regulation works no hardship on 
one for the benefit of another, but is impartial, just and reason-
able, imposing a common burden for the benefit of all such own-
ers.132 
Again we see that the principle of average reciprocity of advantage 
involves a narrow, specific group burdened with an appropriation 
scheme police power regulation and receiving particular direct ben-
efits from the regulation while the public indirectly benefits. The 
motivation of the lower court in Plymouth Coal, and, it can be 
inferred, of Justice Holmes, is that the Barrier Pillar Act, although 
substantially diminishing certain property interests, does not oper-
ate simply to redistribute property rights because at least on its 
face, the regulation acts to reciprocally benefit burdened mine own-
ers.133 
Lastly, in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co. itself, the Supreme Court 
was unwilling to allow a claim that a Pennsylvania common wall law 
took property without just compensation. 134 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that custom was enough to uphold the law, but it expressly 
approved of the state court's alternate holding justifying the law 
with what Holmes labelled average reciprocity of advantage. 135 The 
common wall statute, like the police power regulations in the cases 
130 [d. at 147-48, 149-51. 
131 [d. at 148-50. In other words, even if the protection of miners did not constitute pro-
tecting the public safety, and thus the Barrier Pillar Act was not a public nuisance regulation, 
the public interest or welfare was forwarded by the regulation. No taking occurred because 
in forwarding the public interest the regulation generated specific benefits for the mineowners. 
132 [d. at 149. 
133 For the relationship and importance of redistributive effects in takings analysis, see 
Rose, supra note llO, at 583-97; Michelman, supra note 3, at 1203-45; L. TRIBE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CHOICES ch. 10 (1985). 
134 260 U.S. at 31. A common wall law requires a single wall between buildings of adjoining 
owners to be built partly on each owner's property. Each owner is given dominion over the 
wall and is able to repair or alter it without consent. See also Smoot v. Heyl, 227 U.S. 518 
(1913) (common wall statute held invalid as applied). 
135 [d. at 30. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158 (1919). 
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previously discussed, allowed an actual appropriation of the owner's 
property rights, but conferred the same right on the owner and also 
specifically benefitted the owner and generally benefitted the public 
by decreasing fire hazards associated with urban development of the 
period. 136 In Jackman, average reciprocity of advantage was held to 
validate a police power regulation which had the immediate effect of 
allowing one private property owner to physically appropriate the 
adjacent owner's private property interests. 137 
As it was developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the principle of average reciprocity of advantage is largely 
based on the underlying philosophy that economic development 
should be encouraged to benefit the overall quality of life. Average 
reciprocity of advantage concerned police power regulations which 
forced economic development of non-injurious property interests 
rather than regulating noxious uses of property. The owner's use, 
or perhaps more correctly, choice of use, of certain property interests 
were appropriated to achieve the societal goal of economic develop-
ment to improve the general welfare. The idea that this development 
made the owner's overall property interests monetarily more valu-
able was seen as at least a sufficient offset for the owner's forced 
contribution of property or a monetary share of the costs. Although 
the owner had lost his or her freedom of choice as to how best use 
his or her property, society had made an efficient choice for the 
owner, and thus due process of law did not mandate that the regu-
lation be accompanied by compensation. The later use of the principle 
in Noble Bank and Plymouth Coal rested not only on encouraging 
development but on improving the welfare of certain private indi-
viduals and thereby indirectly advancing the public interest in 
safety.138 However, Noble Bank and Plymouth Coal also rest on the 
idea that the police power regulation is valid because it reciprocally 
benefits the affected parties by increasing the efficiency, and thus 
the exploitation, of their private property interests. 139 Noble Bank 
and Plymouth Coal can be said to rest on the idea that a risk-free 
business was more valuable than a dangerous one. 
In sum, Justice Holmes' phrase "average reciprocity of advantage" 
referred to the principle that certain uncompensated police power 
136Id. 
137 Plymouth Coal Company, Jackman, Noble State Bank, Wurts, Fallbrook Irrigation 
District are all physical appropriations or physical interferences with property interests. 
138 Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. at 113; Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, 232 Pa. 
at 146-47. 
139 Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. at 111-113, Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Company, 232 
Pa. at 149. In practice the two coal companies would contract at some point to remove the 
wall after each has exhausted its mine. 
1987] REGULATORY TAKINGS 679 
exercises were constitutional because of the specific reciprocal ben-
efits they generated which compensated any burdened owners. It 
was merely the principle of "special benefit" taxing districts ex-
tended to analogous police power exercises. 140 The principle of these 
districts was that even though the public may benefit generally from 
an improvement project, specific individual property owners could 
be forced to bear the cost, in the form of betterment assessments or 
set-offs against eminent domain damages, as long as these owners 
were not forced to contribute more than the "special" local benefits 
to their parcels of land. 141 
Property regulation which provided average reciprocity of advan-
tage was viewed as a valid use of the police power because it was 
140 See generally Misczynski, Special Assessments in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND 
VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 311-35 (Hagman and Misczynski eds. 1978). 
141 In the context of a special benefit district tax assessment case, then-Chief Justice Holmes 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressed this principle in the following manner: 
It would be a matter for regret if the law as worked out by the courts with regard 
to the constitutional powers of the Legislature should be found to have taken so 
scholastic a form that an actual effect upon a well defined and limited part of a city 
which might be so distinct as to change the character of its use and to double its 
market value could not be recognized as a benefit when it came to the imposition of 
a tax .... 
Upon a question of set-off against the payment for property taken for public uses, 
the line might be drawn strictly in order to give full effect to the constitutional 
requirement that what is taken shall be paid for. But it has been recognized that 
benefits which could not be set off might justify an assessment. And even by way of 
set-off in a proceeding for damages caused by the taking of land for a railroad it has 
been held that any peculiar increase of value in the market could be allowed. 
It is plain that the fact that the rise in value is common to all or many of the 
estates upon a street would not prevent the benefit being sufficiently peculiar for a 
betterment tax. No doubt it might be hard to draw the line between some cases 
when the benefit might be held special and a general advance of real estate in the 
vicinity which often has been said not to be sufficient for set-off, although it is to be 
noticed that Mr. Chief Justice Gray, in speaking of benefits that cannot be assessed 
for, describes them as those which extend to all estates in the same town or city .... 
Again the fact that the improvement is for a public purpose of course is no objection 
to the tax. To invalidate the betterment assessment, the general public benefit must 
be the only result of the improvement. Such a change may have a double aspect of 
general public benefit and also of peculiar local advantage. It is suggested, to be 
sure, that the special benefits cannot be made the basis of a tax when they are only 
incidental and not the object to which the improvement was directed. But we see 
nothing in the Constitution to prevent it, or to make the power of the Legislature 
depend upon which of two resultant advantages is especially before its mind when it 
makes a change in the streets. In this case plainly it contemplated improving the 
petitioners' land as it provided for making them pay their share of the cost of the 
improvement. 
As to the remoteness or speculative character of the advantage, we do not see 
what trouble there is on the former ground if the Legislature says that the advantage 
is near enough .... [citations omitted] 
Sears v. Street Commissioners, 180 Mass. 274, 280-82, 62 N.E. 397, 400 (1902). See also Gast 
Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55, 58-60 (1916). 
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reasonable. More specifically, the principle operated only to validate 
police power regulations which were challenged as redistributions of 
property rights among definable private individuals. 142 It should be 
noted that all these average reciprocity of advantage cases involve 
the police power being used to promote a mutual development 
scheme and all the cases contain some identifiable "burdened" and 
"benefitted" parties. It is also significant that in these cases the 
Court was not using the Lawton ends-means substantive due process 
test which it had applied to constitutional challenges to police power 
prevention of public nuisances. Instead, these cases used an analysis 
which focused only on proper public purpose and mutuality of benefit. 
II. PENNSYLVANIA COAL 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon143 is the central case in regulatory 
takings in the sense that it has shaped all modern discussion of the 
issue. After examining the aforementioned three lines of cases, one 
is in a position to understand the majority opinion of Justice Holmes 
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in this seminal case. 
Pennsylvania Coal involved a Pennsylvania statute called the Koh-
ler Act which attempted to prohibit the mining of anthracite coal 
located beneath property if that mining would cause subsidence of 
various surface uses. 144 The Mahons were homeowners whose pred-
ecessor in interest had acquired the surface estate from the coal 
company but had not acquired the subsurface rights. Under the act, 
the Mahons were granted an injunction which prohibited the coal 
company from mining beneath their surface property. The coal com-
pany then brought suit under the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitu-
tions claiming that the Kohler Act impaired the obligation of con-
142 Or between definable groups of individuals. Compare to Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. at 156-
58, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16 which discuss the reasonableness of a 
redistribution to the public. One should also note that in all the average reciprocity of 
advantage cases the police power was used to these property interests only because they 
possessed some condition which affected the public interest. 
143 Any review of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon should now consider the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of that opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, lO7 S.Ct. 
1232 (1987). See infra notes 282-343 and accompanying text. Recent commentaries on Penn-
sylvania Coal include: Rose, supra note 110; P. McKinley and J. Barratt, Pennsylvania Coal 
Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is The Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the 
Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TULSA L. REV. 418 (1981); BOSSELMAN, 
supra note 3, at 126-38, 240-50. 
144 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13. See The Kohler Act, P.L. 1198 (May 27, 1921). 
1987] REGULATORY TAKINGS 681 
tracts and took property without just compensation in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment. 145 
Writing for the eight justice majority, Justice Holmes began his 
Pennsylvania Coal opinion with the traditional determination of 
whether the police power regulation advanced a general public pur-
pose. 146 He reasoned that the case only involved a private home-
owner and that the parties' risks and rights had been contractually 
reserved by deed. 147 While subadjacent mining had caused some 
degree of safety risk and fear in the region,148 Holmes noted that 
safety could be provided for by notice, and thus he rejected public 
safety as justifying this restriction on property use. 149 Instead, 
Holmes believed that the statute interfered with private property 
and contractual rights in order to confer benefits to a small number 
of private individuals such as the Mahons - a narrow objective which 
did not amount to a public purpose. 150 
However, stating that the case "had been argued in a manner 
which required the statute be treated generally," Holmes conceded 
that enough of a public interest existed to use the power of eminent 
domain. 151 In other words, despite his belief that the Kohler Act was 
invalid if only enacted to prohibit an alleged noxious use of property 
by the coal company, Holmes conceded that public necessity might 
justify interference with noninjurious use of private property in 
order to benefit the public. 152 The latter part of his Pennsylvania 
145 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412. 
146 Id. at 412-14. 
147Id. at 413. 
148 See Rose, supra note 1l0, at 563. 
149 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. 
150Id. 
151Id. at 414. By treating the statute generally, Justice Holmes appears only to have been 
recognizing that a significant number of persons, and the city of Scranton itself were in the 
position of the Mahons. Thus, Holmes was conceding that the Kohler Act did confer benefits 
which were public in nature rather than private-in other words, that public necessity could 
justify the use of the police power or the power of eminent domain. Holmes believed that if 
only the Mahon's residence was concerned, the state could not even use eminent domain to 
transfer the company's property interest. See Note, II Cal. L. Rev. 188 (1923). The narrow 
holding in Pennsylvania Coal is that the Kohler Act is invalid as a taking for the private 
benefit of a homeowner. In Keystone Bituminous Coal, 107 S.Ct. at 1241, a majority of the 
Court suprisingly reached this conclusion. The remainder of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion 
is properly classified as dictum or an "advisory opinion." See id. 
152 This author does not believe that Justice Holmes conceded that the Kohler Act was 
required for public safety, in other words to prevent a public harm. Justice Holmes believed 
that the state could not prohibit the subsidence of property as a public nuisance because 
damage to a private house is not a "common or public" harm and, as to the public property, 
the state had accepted the risk of the danger when it transacted with the coal company to 
682 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:653 
Coal takings analysis focused on whether the police power could be 
used in lieu of eminent domain to accomplish this goal. 
First, Holmes used the average reciprocity of advantage test to 
examine whether the police power could be used to transfer the 
support estate153 from the coal company to other private parties, like 
the Mahons, in order to increase public welfare. Holmes distin-
guished the case of Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania, in which the 
Court eight years earlier had upheld Pennsylvania's Barrier Pillar 
Act. 154 In Holmes' view, that law was unlike the one before the 
Court because the Barrier Pillar Act "was for the safety of employees 
invited into the mine and secured an average reciprocity of advan-
tage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws. "155 
Thus, it can clearly be inferred that, even though they rejected the 
Kohler Act as a public safety regulation, Holmes and the majority 
would have ruled differently if the Kohler Act contained specific 
reciprocal benefits that were generated for all burdened owners by 
the Barrier Pillar Act. 156 Without this average reciprocity of ad van-
buy only the surface estate without the support estate. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 
413-16; infra note 156. 
Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal are largely reconcilable under this view since the Pennsyl-
vania Coal holding applies only to police power regulations which regulate noninjurious uses 
of private property out of a public necessity and not to police power regulations which prohibit 
noxious uses. The holding of Pennsylvania Coal limits the "public necessity" line of police 
power cases, not the "noxious use" line. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (character-
izing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1897), a public necessity conflagration case, as resting 
only on tradition). See supra notes 22, 84, 99 and accompanying text. 
153 The "support estate" is a separate property estate under Pennsylvania common law. See 
Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921). Thus, Pennsylvania 
state law recognized three estates in the parcel of land owned by the Mahons and the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company. The Mahons owned the surface rights, while the coal company 
owned both the subsurface mineral rights and the right to support or not to support the 
surface estate. The city of Scranton was in the same position as the Mahons with respect to 
the portions of the city which had been purchased from the coal company. See Pennsylvania 
Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
154 See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. 
155 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. In other words, Justice Holmes believed that 
Plymouth Coal was distinguishable on the basis of both its alternative holdings. See supra 
notes 130-32 and accompanying text. The principle of average reciprocity of advantage was 
clearly inapplicable to Pennsylvania Coal. See supra Section IC. 
156 However, Justice Holmes would still have found a taking as far as the city of Scranton 
was concerned. In a letter to Sir Fredrick Pollock, Holmes wrote: 
I enclose one of my last decisions [Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon] that you may judge 
whether there is any falling off. It was unpopular in Pennsylvania of course. Brandeis' 
dissent speaks as if what I call average reciprocity of advantage were made the 
general ground by me. Not so I use that only to explain a particular case. My ground 
is that the public only got to this land by paying for it and that if they saw fit to pay 
only for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they need it now any more than 
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tage, the Kohler Act was not as reasonable as the earlier law, and 
as a significant impairment of private property, it could not escape 
the explicit language of the takings clause. 
Using the reasonableness test set out in Block, Holmes next con-
sidered whether the Kohler Act could be justified as a police power 
redistribution of private property rights to the city of Scranton. 157 
He noted that the public chose only to acquire the surface rights to 
the property on which it constructed its streets. 158 He also reasoned 
that whether a police power regulation is permissible is a question 
of degree with one factor being the diminution in value of the prop-
erty.159 In Holmes' and the majority's view, the extent of the regu-
lation of the Kohler Act did go "too far" because it rendered the 
subsurface mineral rights in coal worthless and abolished an estate 
in land. 160 Again, Holmes and the majority reasoned that the use of 
the police power was not as reasonable as previously upheld police 
power actions. Holmes distinguished the rent control law cases of 
Block v. Hirsh and Marcus Brown Leasing Co. v. Feldman as rea-
sonable impairments of private property interests because they in-
volved situations of more pressing public necessity and allowed the 
property owner to charge what was upheld as reasonable rent. 161 In 
addition, Holmes characterized Bowditch v. Boston, an 1879 "over-
riding necessity" case in which the Supreme Court upheld the use 
of the police power to destroy a private home without compensation 
in order to stop the spread of a fire, as "resting more upon tradition 
than reason. "162 
An exact interpretation of Justice Holmes' opinions characterizing 
the conflict between the police power and the power of eminent 
they could have taken the right of being there in the first place. Perhaps it would 
have been well if I had emphasized more the distinction between the rights of the 
public in places where they only get any locus standi by a transaction that renounced 
what they now claim. 
M. HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS-THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND SIR FREDRICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 v.2, 109 (1941). Discussing the same opinion in a 
letter to Harold J. Laski, Justice Holmes wrote: "If you read the document you will see that 
I do not as [Brandeis] suggests, rely on average reciprocity of advantage as a general ground, 
but only to explain a certain class of cases." M. HOWE, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916--25, 462 (1953). 
157 See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. 
158 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
159Id. at 413. 
160 Id. at 414. 
161 Id. at 416. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. Justice Holmes indicated that 
these cases went to "the verge of the law, but fell far short of the present act." Pennsylvania 
Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. 
162 I d. at 415-16. 
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domain as a "difference in degree" is difficult.163 Yet his majority 
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal must be read in light of his earlier 
opinions in which he used nearly identical reasoning. Along with 
many of his contemporaries, Holmes viewed the police power as 
encompassing the power to prevent common law nuisances and to 
take de minimus property interests in order to further the general 
welfare. 164 He apparently believed that regulations addressing an 
injurious use of property or a common law nuisance (or near nuis-
ance) never went "too far" in the sense that the burden to the 
individual alone could constitute a taking165 - although these regu-
lations may overregulate or arbitrarily regulate and thereby consti-
tute takings. However, Holmes believed any other police power 
regulation for the general welfare is a redistribution of private prop-
erty to the public which could go too far in terms of the magnitude 
of the burden to the individual. 166 The point of Holmes' "too far" 
reasonableness test is that redistributions of private property solely 
to promote the public welfare must be limited or there can be no 
truly private property. 
This view of Holmes' majority opinion finds support in the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal. 167 The 
dissent argued that if the government regulation addressed a harm 
to the public (that is, a nuisance or noxious use), then the police 
power was absolute and could be used regardless of the extent of 
diminution to the private interest. 168 Brandeis adamently argued that 
neither the State nor private individuals could contractually abrogate 
the police power to provide for the public health and safety, and that 
163 See Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 370, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (1889); Commonwealth v. 
Parks, 155 Mass. 531, 532-33, 30 N.E. 174 (1892); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 546-48, 
26 N.E. 100, 107 (1890); Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496-97, 53 N.E. 910 (1899), Hudson 
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); Martin v. Dist. of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 
139 (1907); Interstate Railway Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1907). 
164 See Commonwealth v. Parks, 155 Mass. at 532-53; Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. at 496-97. 
165 See Miller, 152 Mass. at 546-48, 26 N.E. at 102; See also Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of 
Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1918); Erie R.R. Co. v. Public Utility Commrs., 254 U.S. 394, 410-11 
(1921). Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal cites no public nuisance/noxious 
use cases. Holmes also voted with the majority in ReinrYUln, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), Hadacheck, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915), and Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), all involving substantial 
burdens to private property owners and containing no "difference in degree" reasoning. Thus, 
one can infer that Justice Holmes recognized what the modern Supreme Court is now calling 
the "public nuisance exception" to the takings clause. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 
107 S.Ct. at 1243-46. 
166 In other words, any police power regulation which could not be said to be restricting a 
public nuisance could go "too far." In a letter to Harold J. Laski, Justice Holmes refered to 
the "petty larceny of the police power." M. HOWE, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 457 (1953). 
167 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 417,418,420-22. 
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the legislative determination that the Kohler Act was necessary for 
public safety was correct and the Court should defer to it. 169 Brandeis 
reasoned that the Supreme Court decisions had upheld the absolute 
police power to prevent noxious uses in many different contexts. 170 
Thus, Justice Brandeis' main argument was that the Court should 
have upheld the Kohler Act as a noxious use regulation under the 
deferential Lawton ends-means substantive due process analysis 
which it had previously applied in similar cases. 
As to the use of the police power to interfere with non-noxious 
uses of private property to confer benefits, Justice Brandeis agreed 
that the takings clause did limit the magnitude of the burden which 
could be placed on the individual to achieve a proper public pur-
pose. l71 Brandeis argued under the Block reasonableness test that 
here the diminution in value was not as severe as the majority 
believed, because he disagreed with the majority on the divisibility \ 
of an owner's property interests in a parcel of land. Brandeis argued, 
that the parcel must be viewed as a whole in order to assess any \ 
economic loss from regulation.172 Average reciprocity of advantage, 
in Brandeis' view, was necessary to validate the use of police power 
in lieu of the power of eminent domain, only where direct transfers 
of property interests in "neighborhood" type regulations resulted in 
the generation of public benefit. 173 The principle had "no place" in 
this case, where the police power was being used to prohibit a 
noxious use. 174 Alternatively, he argued that the prohibition of a 
noxious use always provides an average reciprocity of advantage in 
169 [d. at 416-22. 
170 [d. The Supreme Court used the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test in all 
of these cases. 
171 See id. at 419, 422. Bosselman, Callais and Banta argue that Justice Brandeis believed 
there was a difference in kind between an exercise of the police power and an exercise of 
eminent domain requiring just compensation. BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, at 247. This is correct 
as to noxious uses, but Brandeis did not argue that a police power regulation to confer benefits 
could never be a taking in the sense that the burden to the individual alone violates the 
takings clause. Brandeis did join the Court's opinion in Block and The Rent Law cases. See 
supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. See also Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Ry. 
Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 404, 
429-30 (1935). 
~ 260 U.S. at 419. Justice Holmes and the majority were willing to look at the economic 
diminution to the coal required to provide subadjacent support caused by the regulation. [d., 
at 415-16. Holmes, in effect, argued that diminution in value should be measured on the! 
separate "support" or "third" estate recognized by Pennsylvania common law, while Justice i 
Brandeis believed that a court should look at the economic loss measured against the combined I 
value of the three estates. I 
173 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 422. 
174 [d. 
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the sense that it makes civilized communities possible. 175 In other 
words, Brandeis referred to the older belief that proper uses of the 
police power (which clearly includes the prohibition of public nuis-
ances) always confer reciprocal benefits.176 
Thus, Justice Brandeis' dissent is consistent with the Pennsylva-
nia Coal majority's holding. Brandeis shared the majority's view 
that the takings clause mandated that the police power could not be 
used to redistribute private property. His exceptions which allow 
the use of police power where regulation amounts to confiscation 
rest on the basis that no redistributions in property rights occur. 
The public harm exceptions seek only to restrict private usurpation 
of surrounding private property interest, while the average reci-
procity of advantage exceptions are cases in which mutual advan-
tages accrue to the affected party and the recipient one.177 Justice 
Brandeis certainly did not advocate a different regulatory takings 
analysis than the one espoused by the majority in Pennsylvania 
Coal. Rather, he simply disagreed with the majority because he 
believed that the Kohler Act should be upheld as a noxious use 
regulation, and thus the magnitude of the burden to the coal company 
could not go "too far" as long as the Act was reasonably related to 
the abatement of the noxious use. 
Pennsylvania Coal represents a logical development in Supreme 
Court regulatory takings doctrine, rather than a substantial depar-
ture from it. The case is remarkable because of the unique factual 
situation which allowed Justice Holmes to uncharacteristically fail 
to exercise deference to a legislative determination and to find no 
room for the police power to prevent noxious use despite the obvious 
damage and loss of life which was occurring. 178 The opinion addresses 
175Id. 
176 See supra note 22. Justice Brandeis' broader view of reciprocal benefits is very different 
than the principle of average reciprocity of advantage that Justice Holmes and the majority 
use to distinguish Pennsylvania Coal from Plymouth Coal. See supra notes 141-42, 154-56 
and accompanying text. Justice Brandeis' remark is best viewed as a quip, rather than a 
genuine elaboration of the principle of average reciprocity of advantage. Brandeis clearly 
understood that the principle of average reciprocity of advantage involves only special benefits 
to burdened owners in mutual cooperation schemes. Brandeis' comment that noxious use 
regulations always provide an average reciprocity of advantage may have been the result of 
an erroneous beliefthat average reciprocity of advantage was central to the majority's holding. 
See supra note 156. 
177 See id. at 417,422. 
178 Contemporaneous law review notes share the belief that the disagreement between 
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal was based on their different beliefs 
concerning the state legislative determination that the statute was necessary for public safety, 
and not on different views of the regulatory takings test as some modern commentators have 
suggested. See Note, 11 CAL. L. REV. 188 (1923); Note, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1923), 
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a takings clause limitation on the police power where the government 
purpose is to solve a public problem or increase the general welfare 
by redistributing non-noxious private property to other private prop-
erty owners or to the public as a proprietor. Holmes' analysis does 
not address any takings clause limitation to the police power to 
regulate a public nuisance or noxious use of property. Thus, it is 
incorrect to conclude that in Pennsylvania Coal Justice Holmes 
introduced a new takings test which overrides the substantive due 
process test of police power regulation of public nuisances. His test 
addresses the situation in which public necessity provided a proper 
public purpose for a regulation which redistributed noninjurious pri-
vate property interests. 179 Because the Pennsylvania Coal Court is 
answering this limited question, it does not use the Lawton ends-
means substantive due process test. 180 Rather, the Court looks to 
the Kohler Act's reasonableness under the principle of the average 
reciprocity of advantage line of cases and under the Block reason-
ableness test. Distinguishing these latter cases, the majority held 
that the Kohler Act was not reasonable in that it substantially and 
permanently usurped private property interests and redistributed 
them to the city of Scranton, and to private individuals with no 
reciprocal benefit to the coal company. 
III. EUCLID AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE POLICE POWER'S 
ABILITY TO ARBITRATE AMONG PRIVATE LAND USES 
When the cases are properly understood, Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co. 181 is at least as important as Pennsylvania Coal in terms of the 
Note, 21 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1923); Note, 36 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1923); Note, 32 YALE L.J. 
511 (1923); Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power 1922-1930, 18 VA. L. REV. 1, 
10-12 (1931). 
179 It is for this reason that th~ Pennsylvania Coal analysis was not applied in subsequent 
regulatory takings cases involving public nuisance or zoning regulations. See infra text at 
Section III. The one case in the next decade which does vaguely apply the "too far" principle 
of Pennsylvania Coal is a case involving regulation of the noninjurious property of a common 
carrier whose business is subject to regulation in the public interest, not a public nuisance 
police power case. See Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Ry. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 
182, 193 (1928). 
180 Block and Pennsylvania Coal should be compared to the contemporaneous contract 
clause cases such as Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 436-38 (1933). 
As the uses of the police power expanded to the point where the Court could no longer deny 
that the purpose of regulation was to deal with a public necessity by explicitly taking property 
for public use or impairing the obligation of contracts, the Court adopted a "reasonableness" 
constitutional balancing test to uphold regulations which were not extremely redistributive, 
and did not strictly construe the express constitutional provisions prohibiting such government 
action. 
181 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Bettman, The Decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Euclid Village Zoning Case, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 184 (1927). 
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development of the Supreme Court's analysis of the police power 
regulation of private property. Euclid involved the facial constitu-
tionality of a comprehensive zoning plan which divided the village 
into different districts, allowing certain land uses in each district. 
Zoning had rapidly developed as a tool for municipalities to restrict 
and control urban growth. 182 It was clear that the power to zone was 
desirable, if not necessary, to regulate the interrelationship of prop-
erty interests in urban communities. As an exercise of police power, 
however, zoning had little justification in terms of judicial prece-
dent. 183 Specifically, zoning went well beyond previously sanctioned 
police power prohibitions of nuisances. Indeed, its function was to 
prevent situations which could result in future nuisances. l84 In ad-
dition, zoning often involved significant diminution in value of private 
property when it allowed only a residential or other use of limited 
profitability. State courts were split on the issue of whether zoning 
ordinances constituted regulatory takings, with a majority upholding 
zoning. 185 
The United States District Court held the Euclid zoning law to 
be an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. 186 This 
court had followed an analysis one would expect if the above inter-
pretation of Pennsylvania Coal is correct. 187 First, the court recited 
the finding of a referee that the plaintiff had been deprived of "the 
normal and reasonably to be expected use" of its property rights to 
an unconstitutional extent. 188 In addition, like Holmes in Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the court struggled with the issue of whether a public 
use existed at all, eventually deferring to the legislative judgment. 189 
The lower court then looked to the two situations which would allow 
182 Contemporaneous zoning articles include: Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 835 (1924); Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 
MINN. L. REV. 593 (1925); Byrne, The Constitutionality of a General Zoning Ordinance, 11 
MARQ. L. REV. 189 (1927); Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of 
City Planning and Zoning, 24 U.ILL. L. REV. 135 (1929). For a list of all contemporaneous 
scholarship on the issue of zoning, see Powell, supra note 178, at 18-21 nn.37, 38, 39, 40. 
183 See generally Bettman, supra note 182; Young, supra note 182. 
184 See Bettman, supra note 182, at 836-37. 
185 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390-91; Bettman, supra note 182, at 846 n.l4. But see Euclid, 
297 F. Supp. 307, 316-17 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
186 Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. Supp. 307, 317 (N. D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 
272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
187 See the district court's discussion of the relationship of the police power used to promote 
the public welfare, the police power to prohibit public nuisances, and police power exercises 
which confer an average reciprocity of advantage. Id. at 314-15. 
188 Id. at 308-09. 
189 I d. at 312. 
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a substantial deprivation of property under the use of police power. 
The court reasoned that the zoning ordinance could not be justified 
as an exercise of the police power to abate or prevent nuisances, 190 
nor did it provide an average reciprocity of advantage. 191 
The United States Supreme Court was largely willing to defer to 
the legislative judgment that the zoning ordinance was necessary 
for protection and welfare of the public. 192 The Court sought to 
justify the zoning ordinance in terms of precedent but recognized 
that the old concepts of property and police power were increasingly 
inapplicable to modern urban society.193 The Euclid Court took a 
very practical view of property, reasoning that land use is a public 
nuisance because of the context in which it is conducted: 
[T]he question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be 
determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or 
of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection 
with the circumstances and the locality. A nuisance may be 
190 See id. at 310, 315. 
191 Id. at 315-16. The lower court specifically held that average reciprocity of advantage did 
not operate to validate this general zoning ordinance. Scholars had suggested that the general 
principles of the average reciprocity of advantage cases might be used to allow zoning to 
withstand a regulatory taking challenge because, as in those cases, neighboring property 
owners are being given rights in each other's property in the public interest. See Byrne, supra 
note 182, at 206-07; Young, supra note 182, at 602-04. As in the earlier appropriation cases, 
unwilling owners are being forced to participate in a development plan which confers com-
parable benefits to all owners-here, a more orderly and efficient community and the oppor-
tunity to enjoy property interests free from incompatible surrounding land use. Freund, 87tpra 
note 182, at 146-47; Bettman, supra note 182, at 844-45. However, it appears that few courts 
or scholars believed that the principles of the average reciprocity of advantage cases could be 
used to validate zoning ordinances which significantly burdened property interests. For ex-
ample, Alfred Bettman (who argued Euclid before the Supreme Court) in his leading article 
mentioned these cases only "in passing." See Bettman, supra note 182, at 844. 
Upon closer scrutiny, one realizes that the principles of the average reciprocity of advantage 
cases do not apply to a general zoning ordinance. A comprehensive zoning ordinance does not 
place roughly equal use restrictions on all burdened owners. Rather, such an ordinance aims 
to place different use restrictions (i.e. different burdens) on different districts. Similarly, a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance generates general benefits shared by all, not comparable 
special economic benefits inuring to burdened owners. See supra note 141 and accompanying 
text; Euclid, 297 F. Supp. at 316. Even if a zoning ordinance could be said to generate specific 
economic benefits to all burdened owners, one should note that, particularly in the 1920's, 
owners burdened with fewer use restrictions received greater economic benefits from the 
ordinance than those with greater use restrictions. In contrast, the police power exercises in 
the average reciprocity of advantage cases were non-discriminatory on their face. Any dis-
parity in owners' benefits and burdens in the average reciprocity of advantage cases was due 
to the particular conditions of each parcel (presumably unknown to legislators), and not to a 
legislative policy decision which in effect allocated special benefits and burdens. 
192 Id. at 388-90, 395. 
19S Id. at 387. See Bettman, supra note 181, at 188. 
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merely a right thing in the wrong place - like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard. 194 
Thus, in contrast to the lower court, the Supreme Court was willing 
to view the police power regulation as a valid extention of the 
regulation of nuisances. 195 However, the Court refrained from treat-
ing the scope of the police power as coterminous with the power to 
suppress or prevent nuisances. 196 Rather it argued that zoning was 
part of the police power because it was justified by the same reasons 
as, and thus analogous to, the public nuisance police power. 197 Thus, 
the Euclid Court both affirmed and expanded state and municipal 
police powers by redefining the police power to arbitrate between 
property uses. The Supreme Court accepted planned private prop-
erty restrictions in order to prevent incompatible neighboring uses 
as a legitimate police power goal. 198 
In line with precedent involving police power regulations of nox-
ious property use, Justice Sutherland's opinion effectuated the tak-
ings clause guarantee using the Lawton ends-means substantive due 
process test, and did not apply the Block/Pennsylvania Coal rea-
sonableness test. 199 Euclid and the few subsequent zoning cases 
decided by the Court established that the Court would only use the 
194 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. See also this Court's general discussion of zoning cases, id. at 
390-95. 
195 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-99. The Euclid Court also referred to reciprocal benefits, noting 
that a zoning plan applied throughout the village and benefits all owners. [d. at 391-93. 
However, the Court's discussion appears in the form of a proper public purpose policy argu-
ment supporting zoning as desirable, and it is clear that the Euclid Court did not rely on 
average reciprocity of advantage to justify the zoning ordinance. Euclid was not a typical 
average reciprocity of advantage case because it involved no direct transfer of property 
interests and only very indirect, and not necessarily comparable benefits among owners. See 
Euclid, 297 F. Supp. at 315-16. See also supra note 191. 
196 [d. at 387-88. Bettman, supra note 181, at 188. 
197 Euclid,272 U.S. at 387-95. See Bettman, supra note 181, at 188-89. It was argued by 
at least one commentator that the police power to prohibit nuisances or noxious uses allowed 
greater government interference with private property than the police power to zone. See 
Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 739 (1930). Such a distinction 
makes sense from the standpoint of the public purposes which justify these two different uses 
of the police power and from an approach which balances the private harm with the public 
harm being prevented by regulation. 
198 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 391,394-95. 
199 [d. at 386, 395. One should note that the lower court had relied on Pennsylvania Coal 
in finding the ordinance an unconstitutional taking. Euclid, 297 F. Supp. at 311-15. Yet the 
United States Supreme Court did not even mention the case because it viewed zoning as a 
proper exercise of the police power similar to public nuisance regulation. In the one subsequent 
zoning case where the Court found a regulatory taking it did so using the Lawton ends-means 
substantive due process test, not the Block/Pennsylvania Coal reasonableness test. See 
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). 
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Lawton ends-means substantive due process test to examine 
whether the land use dictated by a zoning ordinance was reasonably 
related to the goals of zoning: to further the public health, safety, 
and welfare by preventing incompatible neighboring uses. 200 The 
important factor in judging the constitutionality of a zoning restric-
tion was the reasonableness of the use in light of surrounding uses. 201 
Two years after Euclid, a unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed 
a broad police power to prevent and abate public nuisances in Miller 
v. Schoene. 202 Miller concerned a Virginia statute designed to protect 
the state's apple orchards from cedar rust which threatened to de-
stroy them.203 The Court upheld the statute which declared red cedar 
trees to be a public nuisance and required the owners of these red 
cedar trees to cut them down without compensation. 204 The Supreme 
Court rejected the cedar tree owners argument that their private 
property was being destroyed in order to protect other private 
property and not because it was a public nuisance. 205 The Court 
reasoned that the choice between noncompatible private property 
interests was the essence of the nuisance power. 206 It held that the 
size and importance of the state's apple industry implicated the 
public interest. 207 Thus, the Miller Court held that serious public 
economic effects, and not simply direct human health and safety 
effects, are sufficient to justify an application of the police power to 
prevent public nuisances. 208 Using the Lawton ends-means substan-
tive due process test it had previously employed in regulatory tak-
ings challenges of public nuisance police power regulation, the Su-
200 See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-10 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 
188-89 (1928); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Washington ex rei Seattle 
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1929). 
201 Bettman, supra note 182, at 849; Freund, supra note 182, at 146-47. 
202 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
203 [d. at 277-78. 
204 [d. 
205 [d. at 279. This argument had some merit because the rust fungus spread back and forth 
between the cedar and apple trees, harming only the latter. The fungus was harmless to 
humans. See id. at 278. 
206 [d. at 279-80. Professor Stoebuck argues that Miller was based on the emergency or 
overriding necessity doctrine. Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1067. However, the Court's discus-
sion indicates that Miller was based on a public I'lUisance rationale, and the cases cited in 
Miller are public nuisance cases. See id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court had already 
overruled the necessity doctrine by implication in Pennsylvania Coal. See 260 U.S. at 415-
16; supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text. But see U.S. v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 
(1952). 
207 Miller, 276 U.S. at 279 . 
• 208 To a large extent Miller rests on the same rationale as the "changing condition" public 
nuisance cases. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. 
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preme Court held that Virginia's police power regulation was not 
unreasonable and thus was valid without compensation. 209 
In effect, Euclid and Miller collectively establish that where the 
police power is being used to arbitrate among noncompatible private 
property interests, the Supreme Court's regulatory takings test was 
solely the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test. Fur-
thermore, reasoning that such a use of the police power was tradi-
tionally and appropriately a matter of state and local concern, the 
Court exercised much deference to local government decisions in its 
substantive due process approach.210 Thus, it is clear that the nature 
of the police power regulation was of utmost importance in the 
regulatory takings test as it stood in 1930. 
This deferential review of police power arbitration of land use, 
combined with the continued deterioration of public purpose scru-
tiny, opened the floodgates for regulation which significantly re-
stricted private property. The wide array of police power land use 
regulation which had now been sanctioned by the Court's substantive 
due process approach left little need for the "reasonableness test" of 
Pennsylvania Coal or for the average reciprocity of advantage test, 
because only in a few cases were such arguments necessary. The 
Great Depression of the 1930's and the Court's determination to limit 
its review of economic and social legislation211 further increased the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down regulation of private 
property in the relatively few regulatory takings claims it did decide. 
Although the Supreme Court altered its regulatory takings anal-
ysis significantly in the 1919-1929 decade, it is clear that in the 
subsequent years, state courts were unable to derive a regulatory 
takings test based on the cases decided in that period. This devel-
opment is significant because, for the next half century, regulatory 
takings doctrine in general became less and less clear as it evolved 
in different directions at the state court level. 212 The Supreme Court 
itself must accept the responsibility for this development because 
the Court declined to hear land use regulatory taking claims without 
ever comprehensively explaining its constitutional takings test. 213 In 
209 Miller, 276 U.S. at 280. 
210 But see Nectow, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1927) (residential use classification struck down 
as unreasonable). 
211 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the 
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34. 
212 See generally Bosselman et aI, supra note 3, at 141-94. 
213 Perhaps the Court's best attempt to sum up its takings rationale was that of Justice 
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addition, Euclid and Miller made impossible any distinction between 
noxious use police power regulations and regulations of non-noxious 
property justified by public necessity. Yet, it is on this ultimately 
unsupportable distinction that Pennsylvania Coal and all of the 
Court's pre-1930 precedent are based. Finally, in cases involving 
the "liberty to contract," the Supreme Court proceeded to bury the 
substantive due process test of economic and social legislation with-
out relating this to the substantive due process test of regulation of 
economic uses of real property as it was left by Euclid and Miller. 214 
Such explanations were crucial given the dynamic changes in con-
stitutionallaw forged by the Supreme Court in the Great Depression 
and following decades. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S MODERN "BUNDLE OF RIGHTS" 
TAKINGS CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
A. Regulatory Takings and the Burger Court 
The Supreme Court's conclusion that land use regulation was a 
matter for local government meant that the Court would not hear 
takings claims resulting from land use regulation. As a result, before 
the 1978 case of Penn Central Transportation v. New York City,215 
the Supreme Court's regulatory takings doctrine did not advance 
from that used by the Pennsylvania Coal and Euclid Courts. 216 For 
this reason an analysis of the Court's doctrine will not be fatally 
Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 404 (1935). In holding that an 
assessment of a railroad company requiring it to pay one-half of the expense of eliminating a 
railroad crossing deprives the company of its property without due process of law, Justice 
Brandeis reasoned: " ... when particular individuals are singled out to bear the cost of 
advancing the public convenience, that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to the 
evils to be eradicated or the advantages to be secured." Id. at 429. While this test does draw 
general principles from the Court's different precedents, Brandeis' approach, in effect, sug-
gests a Lawton ends-means analysis of all police power regulation challenged as a regulatory 
taking. See supra text accompanying note 54. Of course, since Walters was an assessment 
case the Court did not have to consider the question of whether the magnitude of a use 
restriction rises to the level of an exercise of eminent domain. 
214 See supra note 211. Commenting on the dual standard of deferential Supreme Court 
review of legislation affecting "economic rights" and that affecting "personal rights" which 
Justice Stone set down in Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4, Learned Hand said: "Just 
why property itself was not a 'personal right' nobody took the time to explain." L. HAND, 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 206 (1960). 
215 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
216 See Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 
607, 611, 613 (1981); Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1069 (1980); BOSSELMAN ET AL, supra note 
3, at 134-38; See also B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION, 8 (1977); 
Sax II, supra note 3, at 149. 
694 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:653 
flawed by moving directly to an examination of the decisions of the 
Burger Court.217 The Supreme Court apparently regards all the 
cases discussed so far as good law. Therefore recent decisions should 
be examined in the light of their supporting precedent. 
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court allowed one of the broadest 
applications of the police power in the area of land use. 218 Penn 
Central is particularly significant because in their attempt to for-
mulate a framework in which to decide a regulatory takings claim 
based on a new type of land use regulation, the justices were unable 
to agree on the principles guiding their regulatory takings doctrine. 
The case concerned the application of New York City's landmark 
law to Grand Central Station terminal. As owners of a designated 
historical landmark, the company was placed under an affirmative 
obligation to maintain the structure and was required to obtain 
approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission before mak-
217 See Dunham, supra note 3, for a complete discussion of cases decided in the 1932-1962 
period. Consistent with Sections I, II, and III of this Comment, Professor Dunham's conclusion 
was that the "crazy-quilt pattern" of Supreme Court takings decisions could best be explained 
as relying on a harm-benefit rationale. Dunham, supra note 3, at 73-80. Dunham concluded 
that if the purpose of the government regulation was to provide a public benefit it was likely 
to be found a taking if private property interests were substantially impaired, while regulations 
attempting to prohibit private interests from being used to harm the public were likely to be 
found constitutional without the payment of just compensation. [d. at 80. 
At least two regulatory takings decisions in this period, United States v. Central Eureka 
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), deserve 
mention. Central Eureka Mining Co. involved a 1942 order of the War Production Board 
which required the mining company's non-essential gold mines to cease operations. The order 
was motivated by the shortage of experienced miners and equipment necessary to operate 
essential, war related mines. 357 U.S. at 166-67. The Supreme Court essentially applied the 
Block/Pennsylvania Coal reasonableness test and found that under the exigencies of war the 
order was a reasonable regulation and not a compensable taking. [d. at 168-69. The facts that 
the order was a temporary, non-physical invasion of the company's property interests, and 
did not result in a loss of all value of the mining equipment also influenced the outcome of the 
Court's balancing test. See id. at 166-69. Justice Harlan dissented reasoning that the regu-
lation was not restricting an injurious use of property and went "too far" in burdening the 
mine owners to obtain a public benefit. [d. at 181-84. 
Goldblatt involved a gravel company challenging a town ordinance w~ich prohibited dredging 
and pit excavation below the water table within town limits. Writing f6r the unanimous Court, 
Justice Clark reasoned that regulation (apparently including noxious use regulation) could be 
so onerous as to constitute a compensable taking. 369 U.S. at 594. However, given the lack 
of evidence on the record showing a diminution in value, Justice Clark reasoned that in this 
case the Court need not decide how far a regulation must go before it constitutes a taking. 
[d. Turning to the traditional Lawton ends-means substantive due process noxious use regu-
lation analysis, the Court found the ordinance constitutional. [d. at 594-96. Goldblatt also 
indicates that the "reasonableness" of the ordinance depends on a comparison of the burden 
on the individual and the benefit to the public interest. [d. at 595-96. 
218 See Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 
482-83 (1983). 
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ing any alteration.219 Penn Central contracted with a developer to 
build a 55-story tower above the terminal. 220 The city denied ap-
proval for the alteration on the grounds that it would destroy the 
aesthetic qualities of the structure. 221 The company then brought 
suit claiming the application took its property without just compen-
sation and without due process of law. 222 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion used a framework which linked 
the Pennsylvania Coal reasonableness test with the ta~1.J1g~_5~1~ll:§e 
analysis which the Supreme Court had developed in the contextqf 
errnnent domain and inverse condemnation claims. 223 This latter anal-
ysi~-~i~t-~~~i~~s ~h~l1er pr'operty has been "taken" by focu.s.i~.on 
the government's interference with the 1?!,opeTt'y.Q:W.n~I'~S"P.l1nc,n~ .. Qi. 
tig]1Jf?/' that is the owner's various possessory and use interests. 224 
The majority apparently believed that all regulatory takings claims 
should be decided by the "Qll.D..dJe,oLrights" takings clause analysis 
applied to other inverse condemnation claims. Thus, the Court char-
acterized the takings clause as mandating a balancing inquiry de-
signed to ensure "justice and fairness" in any government interfer-
ence with private property.225 First, the government activity must 
have a proper public purpose. 226 The Court also identified several 
factors as particularly significant in its takings clause analysis bal-
ancing inquiry: the character of the action; the economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant; and the interference with distinct 
investment-backed expectations. 227 
Applying this analysis, the Penn Central majority upheld the New 
York landmark law. The majority reasoned that the preservation of 
historic landmarks did serve a public purpose by preserving struc-
tures and areas with special historic, architectural, or cultural sig-
nificance. 228 Furthermore, the burden on Penn Central was not 
unique but was part of a comprehensive plan. 229 The majority held 
219 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 111-14. 
220 [d. at 116. 
221 [d. at 117-18. 
222 [d. at 119. 
223 See id. at 124-38. 
224 See id. at 124-25, 128; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 \'-' 
(1945) (?efinillg "prop~liY"); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegeny 
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). 
225 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 124. 
226 See id. at 129. 
227 [d. at 124. 
228 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 129. 
229 [d. at 133-35. 
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that the application of New York's landmark regulation to Grand 
,Central Station did not deprive Penn Central of its property inter-
liests to an unconstitutional extent because it did not deprive the 
owners of all reasonable use, or completely frustrate reasonable 
Investment-backed expectations.23o 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Stevens, dissented from the majority's view of takings law and the 
decision. The dissent reasoned that a significant interference with, 
or destruction of, private property interests had only been permitted 
as an exercise of police power, instead of the power of eminent 
domain, when the action suppressed noxious uses or when it pro-
vided an average reciprocity of advantage. 231 In the dissent's view 
these two types of police power regulation operated as exceptions 
to the requirement of just compensation.232 Rehnquist believed it 
was clear that the application of the landmark law affected a signif-
icant diminution in value and that it did not attempt to abate an 
injurious use. 233 Thus, the use of the police power could only be 
validated if it provided an average reciprocity of advantage. 234 The 
dissent broadly defined average reciprocity of advantage in the con-
text of typical zoning ordinances where restrictions create similar 
burdens which are approximately offset by the benefits they gen-
erate.235 Although no Supreme Court zoning opinion had ever re-
ferred to average reciprocity of advantage, the Penn Central dis-
senters believed that the principle operated to validate zoning 
regulation. 236 
230 [d. at 136--38. 
231 [d. at 144-47. The dissent did not characterize police power zoning regulations separately, 
rather it incorrectly lumped zoning cases in with police power regulations justified by average 
reciprocity of advantage. See id. at 147; supra notes 191, 195 and accompanying text. 
232 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 144. 
233 [d. at 145-46. 
234 [d. at 147. This author does not read the dissent as suggesting lack of average reciprocity 
of advantage cali be used to invalidate all police power ordinances. The Supreme Court has 
never held that a lack of average reciprocity of advantage alone invalidates a police power 
regulation concerning either noxious or non-noxious use of private property. See supra sections 
IC and II. Clearly, a police power regulation must be found to amount to an exercise of 
eminent domain before the principle of average reciprocity of advantage is necessary to 
validate it as constitutional without compensation. See Jackman, 263 Pa. at 174 (1919), a/I'd, 
260 U.S. 22 (1922). 
235 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 139-40, 147. 
236 [d. at 147. Supreme Court precedent does not support the use of average reciprocity of 
advantage to validate zoning ordinances. The idea that the principles of average reciprocity 
of advantage cases could justify police power zoning regulation was advanced by several 
commentators attempting to find some constitutional law precedent by which courts could 
uphold zoning ordinances challenged as regulatory takings. See supra note 191. However, in 
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Justice Rehnquist recognized that the principle of average reci-
procity of advantage applies when the police power is used to force 
specific owners to transfer their property to other owners for the 
public welfare. 237 In Rehnquist's view the landmark law burdened 
the owner of a historical landmark and not his neighbors with no 
comparable reciprocal benefit.238 The dissent saw the regulation as 
an unconstitutional exercise of police power to redistribute property 
interests from a small group of owners to their neighbors and the 
public at large. 239 
It is not clear whether the majority simply rejected the dissent's 
statement of takings law.240 It is clear that they were unwilling or 
unable to adequately answer the dissent.241 The reason was that the 
Penn Central Court sought to fit all of the Court's inverse condem-
nation and regulatory takings cases into one rubric. In order to do 
this, the Court focused only on the burden to the individual property 
owner's bundle of rights caused by the police power regulation. The 
Court attempted to interpret the meaning of average reciprocity of 
advantage and of the noxious use cases in a manner which fit into 
its bundle of rights approach. The Penn Central majority apparently 
viewed average reciprocity of advantage as part of its overall cal-
culation of individual burden in that the benefits a police power 
regulation generates should generally offset the burdens it creates 
on the affected owner. 242 
The Penn Central Court also did not accept the idea of a public 
nuisance or noxious use exception to the takings clause. 243 The ma-
jority attempted to fit the noxious use and zoning cases into its 
Euclid the district court rejected the idea that average reciprocity of advantage could justify 
zoning. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court apparently agreed 
and upheld zoning as a legitimate use of the police power analogous to preventing noxious 
uses and independent of the principle of average reciprocity of advantage. See supra notes 
192-201 and accompanying text. 
237 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 139-40, 147-48. 
238 [d. 
239 [d. at 147-48, 152-53. 
240 At points the majority seems to reject Justice Rehnquist's analysis. [d. at 133-34 n.30. 
At other points the majority apparently views the landmark law as generating reciprocal 
burdens and benefits which provide an average reciprocity of advantage. See id. at 134-35, 
137. Lastly, the Court did not explicitly reach the issues of a noxious use or average reciprocity 
of advantage exception to the takings clause because it held that the extent of diminution in 
economic value to property interests caused by the landmark law does not amount to an 
exercise of eminent domain. [d. at 137-38. 
241 Sax, supra note 218, at 483. 
242 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 134-135, 137. 
243 [d. at 133-34 n.30. 
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analysis by reasoning that these cases established that uses of the 
police power can significantly diminish property values, and that 
broad based community plans lacked the character of a taking.244 As 
a result, the Penn Central Court justified New York's landmark law 
using noxious use and zoning precedent which did not support this 
type of police power exercise or the Court's regulatory takings anal-
ysis. 245 
Despite its focus on the bundleof rights.tal<ings clauseal}~ly~ 
and its rather tenuous use of pre-1930 precedent, the Penn Central 
Court's holding in a sense is largely consistent with the ends-means 
substantive due process analysis of Lawton, Euclid, and Miller. 246 
One could simply say that the Penn Central Court accepted historic 
preservation as a proper public purpose for police power regulation 
and then found that the landmark law was reasonably related to that 
goal in that it left Grand Cental Station with a reasonable economic 
use in its unaltered historic state. 247 Yet, in subsequent cases the 
Burger Court did not adopt this substantive due process view of 
Penn Central; instead the Court chose to develop a bundle of rights 
balancing approach to all regUlatory takings claims. 
In Andrus v. Allard,248 the Court upheld regulations of the Sec-
retary of the Interior prohibiting the sale of feathers or parts of 
244 Id.; id. at 126-28, 130-3L 
245 These cases rested on the idea that it was within the nature of the police power to 
arbitrate among potential or actual competing economic uses of land, and thus these police 
power actions were not limited by the takings clause except as it was incorporated into the 
Lawton ends-means substantive due process test. 
Penn Central involved a new use of the police power, one which denied property interests 
to certain owners despite granting the same interests to their neighbors. New York City had 
not prohibited what was judged by the legislature to be a non-compatible economic use, it 
had prohibited a compatible use in order to benefit the public. Cf, Sax, supra note 218, at 
482-83 (however, Professor Sax argues that what is occurring is a change in social values not 
an attempt by society to obtain free benefits). Despite the fact that all of Penn Central's 
neighbors had torn down and modernized existing structures, the company was prohibited 
from doing so and was required to maintain the historic structure intact. Id. In addition, New 
York City conceded that the proposed addition to Grand Central Station did not violate any 
of the city's elaborate zoning requirements. Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 146. 
246 See Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 127, 129, 138; Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 
1068 (Professor Stoebuck reasons that the Penn Central Court's approach used substantive 
due process and bundle of rights takings clause analysis as alternate approaches to the takings 
claim). 
247 Under the Lawton ends-means substantive due process test a reasonable economic use 
for the Grand Central Station is important because only by leaving structures with a reasonable 
economic use will a historic preservation police power regulation achieve its objectives. Lack 
of a reasonable economic use, in itself, would not indicate that a police power ordinance 
constitutes a taking. 
248 444 U. S. 51 (1979). 
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protected birds obtained prior to the enactment of the Migratory 
Bird Treaty and Eagle Protection Acts. Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Brennan again reasoned that government regulation 
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good, and that the 
takings clause preserves the government power to regulate subject 
only to the dictates of justice and fairness. 249 Focusing on the bundle 
of rights held by the property owner, Brennan also reasoned that 
diminution of the plaintiff's property value and loss of future profits 
factor into the balancing test, but unaccompanied by any physical 
property restriction, are not dispositive of the issue. 25o The Court 
also compared the prohibition of trading of eagle feathers with earlier 
prohibitions of the sale of intoxicating liquors. 251 Quoting the portion 
of Justice Brandeis' Pennsylvania Coal dissent which commented 
on average reciprocity of advantage, the Court held that the burden 
of the regulation was offset by the reciprocal advantages of living in 
a civilized community and thus was a reasonable burden which does 
not effect a taking in violation of the fifth amendment. 252 
Again in Andrus, the Burger Court's approach was problematical 
in terms of precedent. The purpose of the regulation apparently was 
important to the Court, yet the focus of Andrus is clearly on the 
impact, not the purpose, of the regulation as in early cases. The 
Court does not use the intoxicating liquors cases to develop what 
Justice Rehnquist had termed the noxious use exception to the tak-
ings clause. Instead, Justice Brennan's reasoning appears to be that 
these cases show that prohibition of the right to sell property, if it 
has a proper public purpose, does not take enough interests so as to 
amount to an exercise of eminent domain because it is an interference 
with only one "strand" of the owner's bundle of property rights. 253 
If the prohibition of the sale of bird artifacts is permissible as reg-
ulation of a noxious use, precedent such as Mugler, Lawton, Hada-
check, and Miller indicate that the Court should not have considered 
the impact on property interests unless it did so as part of its analysis 
of the reasonableness of the means of abating the noxious use under 
the ends-means substantive due process test. 254 Additionally, the 
249 [d. at 65. 
250 [d. at 65-66. The Court reasoned that the owners retained a right to profit from the bird 
artifacts, and lost only their right to sell the artifacts. [d. at 66. 
251 [d. at 67. 
252 [d. at 67-68. 
253 See id. at 65-67. 
254 See supra Sections IA and III. The Supreme Court may have analyzed the Secretary of 
the Interior's regulation differently than the noxious use cases because Andrus involved the 
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Andrus Court's use of Justice Brandeis' Pennsylvania Coal dissent 
apparently represents the Court continuing to struggle to fit the 
principle of average reciprocity of advantage into its modern regu-
latory takings test. Here, the Court is so vague that it is difficult to 
give the principle any workable application in the Court's modern 
balancing inquiry. 
In Kaiser Aetna v. U.S.255 and Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robbins256 one sees the Supreme Court further developing its bundle 
of rights analysis. In Kaiser Aetna, the Court found that the congres-
sional creation of a free public right of access to a privately developed 
marina violated the takings clause. Employing its bundle of rights 
takings clause balancing, the Court reasoned that the right of access 
amounted to a physical appropriation of property, and goes so far 
beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation that it 
amounts to a taking.257 It held that the "right to exclude" is such a 
fundamental element of "property" that it falls within the category 
of property interests which government cannot take without just 
compensation. 258 
In Pruneyard Shopping Center, owners of a mall claimed that 
allowing individuals' rights of free speech beyond those guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution's first amendment constituted a 
taking of property.259 Although, like Kaiser Aetna, this case appar-
ently involved the government abrogating "the right to exclude" and 
granting a right of access to the mall owner's property, the Court 
rejected the owner's claim reasoning that the owners had failed to 
demonstrate "that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the 
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized 
limitation of it amounted to a taking. "260 Thus, the Court held, in 
effect, that the state's interference with private property in pro-
moting free expression did not go too far in interfering with the 
exercise of a federal power, rather than a state police power regulation. However, no reasoning 
in Andrus or any subsequent opinion explicitly indicates that this was the case. 
255 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
256 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
257 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174-80. 
258Id. at 179-80. Judge Oakes has noted that it is interesting that the Court did not even 
raise the idea that the marina owners had already received reciprocal benefits from the project. 
Oakes, supra note 216, at 606 n.209. 
259 Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 83. In Pruneyard Shopping Center, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had held that article 1, sec. 2 and 3 of the California Constitution 
guaranteed individual's free speech rights in the shopping center even if the United States 
Constitution's first amendment did not. Id. at 79. 
260 Id. at 84. 
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owner's bundle of property rights, because by opening their property 
to the public, the mall owners did not have a reasonable expectation 
of complete dominion over it. 261 The Pruneyard Shopping Center 
Court then, independently, found that the owners were not deprived 
of their property without (substantive) due process of law. 262 Unfor-
tunately, the Court does not explain why the regulation was subject 
to both a bundle of rights analysis and an independent substantive 
due process analysis. 
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,263 the Supreme Court applied its 
bundle of rights takings balancing approach to a regulatory takings 
claim involving a zoning ordinance. In Agins, the Court held that a 
zoning ordinance which allowed the appellants to develop only one-
family dwellings and open space uses did not on its face take property 
without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. 264 Writing for the the unanimous Court, Justice Powell 
began his analysis in a manner which appears to be ends-means 
substantive due process oriented, reasoning that the regulations are 
exercises of the city's police power to protect its residents from the 
ill effects of urbanization and thus substantially advance legitimate 
government goals. 265 The Court then reasoned that, although it 
might substantially diminish market value, the ordinance did not 
constitute a taking because it did not frustrate reasonable invest-
ment expectations, prevent all economic use of the appellant's land, 
nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership.266 The Court 
further reasoned that "the zoning ordinances benefit the appellants 
as well as the public" and the ordinances affect all property, and 
"(a)ppellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits and 
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power."267 This latter 
reasoning is apparently a reference to the principle of average re-
ciprocity of advantage. 268 Although it is not clear, the Agins Court 
261 [d. at 82-84. 
262 [d. at 84-85. 
263 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
264 [d. at 260-63. The Court held that the owners lacked standing to claim that the zoning 
ordinance constituted a taking as applied to their property. [d. at 260. 
265 [d. at 261. 
266 [d. at 262. 
267 [d. 
266 Justice Powell did not explicitly refer to average reciprocity of advantage. However, his 
reference to a general sharing of burdens and offsetting benefits is consistent with Justice 
Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent which characterized zoning ordinances as restrictions which 
apply over a broad cross section of land and create similar burdens which are approximately 
offset by the benefits they generate and thus secure an average reciprocity of advantage. See 
438 U.S. at 139-40, 147. Justice Rehnquist's definition of average reciprocity of advantage 
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implicitly reasoned that regulation which affects generalized sharing 
of benefits and burdens provides an average reciprocity of advantage 
which validates the uncompensated use of the police power. 
Like Andrus, the police power regulation in Agins was analogous 
to those upheld in precedent and the Court could have decided the 
case in line with substantive due process precedent. However, the 
Burger Court again undertook an independent bundle of rights bal-
ancing analysis which required only that the government purpose 
be proper, and then looked to the extent of the owner's burden. 
Thus, the purpose of the regulation does not shape this side of the 
Agins Court's regulatory taking inquiry.269 The Court simply held 
that the magnitude of the burden to the Agins' private property 
interests was constitutionally permissible. In contrast to the Euclid 
Court's analysis, the Supreme Court's Agins regulatory takings test 
of whether a zoning ordinance affects a taking contains two tiers: a 
zoning ordinance now must not only satisfy the takings clause guar-
antee incorporated into the ends-means substantive due process test, 
but it must also satisfy an independent bundle of rights takings 
clause analysis. 270 
The Burger Court continued to develop the bundle of rights tak-
ings clause analysis as the sole constitutional test for regulatory 
takings claims in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV COrp.271 
Loretto concerned a New York City police power regulation which 
required all landlords to allow the installation of CATV cables in 
their buildings in exchange for a "reasonable fee" which was set at 
one dollar. 272 Landlords could set reasonable conditions to protect 
the aesthetics and safety of their property and the CATV company 
would indemnify landlords for any damage resulting from the in-
stallation, operation, or removal of the cable television equipment.273 
has been embraced by a number of scholars. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 110. In 
addition, a large number of Supreme Court litigation briefs, including the amicus curiae briefs 
of the United States and the State of California in the Agins case, have used Justice Rehn-
quist's definition of average reciprocity of advantage. See also Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. United 
States, 4 Cl. Ct. 625, 630 (1984). 
269 But see id. at 261. 
2'70 [d. at 260-63. The difference could be crucial in the context of a zoning ordinance which 
provides for an across the board building moratorium. Such an ordinance prohibiting all 
development, permanently or temporarily, could withstand an ends-means substantive due 
process analysis if it is substantially related to a proper public purpose. However, because it 
would deny all economic use of land, it would likely constitute a regulatory taking under the 
bundle of rights analysis. See id. at 260. 
2'71 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
272 [d. at 423-24. 
273 [d. at 423. 
1987] REGULATORY TAKINGS 703 
The Loretto Court held that the law amounted to a taking requiring 
compensation, adopting a per se rule that a permanent physical 
occupation authorized by the government so intrudes on the basic 
attributes of ownership that it constitutes a taking without regard 
to the public interests it forwards. 274 
Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested that Loretto seems to 
rest on the Supreme Court's obsession with "permanent physical 
invasions of even the most de minimis variety."275 Indeed, the Loretto 
Court virtually conceded that the regulation would be constitutional 
if it had left the title of ownership in the landlord's possession. 276 
The majority answered the dissent's argument that this was a reg-
ulation of the rental of property, like an ordinance requiring the 
installation of fire safety equipment , 277 by reasoning that a rental 
ordinance is different because it would allow the owner to initiate 
repairs and alterations in the cable equipment herself rather that 
having to call the cable company.278 Rather than the gravity of the 
purpose of the police power regulation having something to do with 
its constitutionality, in Loretto it is only the characterization of the 
particulars of the mode of regulating the bundle of rights that de-
termines a taking. The Loretto opinion shows the Burger Court 
preoccupied with its bundle of rights takings clause analysis, having 
lost sight of the overall issue to be decided - whether the police 
power regulation is reasonable or fundamentally unfair. 279 
In sum, the Burger Court developed a bundle of rights test of 
police power regulation of real property that focused almost exclu-
sively on the burden the regulation places on the affected owner. 
This regulatory takings analysis was essentially the Block/Pennsyl-
vania Coal "reasonableness" test, but it differed from that test in 
that it did not weigh the necessity for regulation against the private 
burden. 280 The bundle of rights analysis also differed from the rea-
274 I d. at 434-35. 
275 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 177 (1985). 
276 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440-41 n.19. See L. TRIBE, supra note 275, at 178. 
277 I d. at 449. 
2781d. at 440-41 n.19. 
279 See L. TRIBE, supra note 275, at 174-79. Read literally as mandating no balancing in 
cases of permanent physical appropriation of property, the Loretto Court's broad per se holding 
is at odds with a number of takings cases discussed in this Comment. See Lawton, 152 U.S. 
133 (1894) (allowing the appropriation and destruction of certain fishing equipment as a 
nuisance); Noble State Bank, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (bank protection scheme which appropriates 
one percent of daily deposits); Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (granting negative ease-
ment in neighboring mine owner's coal barrier wall); and Jackman, 260 U.S. 22 (1922) 
(authorizing third party appropriation of party wall). 
280 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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sonableness test because it was applied to all police power regula-
tions whether they are enacted for the purpose of preventing noxious 
uses or for that of promoting the public welfare. The Burger Court 
interpreted most of the Court's earlier noxious use and average 
reciprocity of advantage precedent in a manner which would make 
this precedent consistent with a bundle of rights approach. 
Under the bundle of rights analysis, the police power regulation 
must have a proper public purpose. In Agins the Court also reasoned 
that zoning ordinances must also satisfy an ends-means substantive 
due process analysis. The Burger Court then examined the character 
of the invasion, that is whether it is regulatory or physical; the 
breadth of the class of burdened owners; and also the types of 
property interests taken by the regulation. Loretto established that 
a regulation authorizing a permanent physical occupation of property 
constitutes a per se taking requiring just compensation for the 
owner. In weighing the extent of the economic burden on the indi-
vidual owner, the Burger Court focused on the extent of the regu-
lation's interference with reasonable, distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations of the owner, and on the extent of diminution of property 
value and the property's remaining uses. Although it did not hold 
that complete economic frustration is a per se regulatory taking, the 
Burger Court suggested that police power regulation must leave 
property with a reasonable remaining economic use.281 Finally, the 
concept of average reciprocity of advantage had some undefined 
weight in the Court's overall ad hoc fairness analysis in that greater 
benefits to burdened owners, or a general sharing of benefits and 
burdens, act to validate uses of the police power which impose 
significant burdens without just compensation. 
B. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis282 , the Rehn-
quist Court's first examination of a regulatory takings claim, pre-
sented a takings challenge very similar to the claim successfully 
advanced by the coal companies sixty-five years earlier in Pennsyl-
vania Coal. 283 In Keystone Bituminous Coal, the coal companies 
claimed that Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land 
Conservation Act, and regulations promulgated pursuant to it, which 
281 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
282 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). 
283 See supra text at Section II. 
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required that fifty per cent of the coal beneath certain structures be 
kept in place to provide surface support, took private property with-
out compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.284 Careful to distinguish the cases as involving different sets 
of "particular facts", a divided Supreme Court reached a different 
result than the Pennsylvania Coal Court, upholding Pennsylvania's 
police power mine subsidence legislation against the coal companies' 
regulatory takings claim. 285 The majority and dissent opinions both 
undertook detailed examinations of Pennsylvania Coal and the ear-
lier noxious use cases, and are the Supreme Court's most complete 
exposition of its regulatory takings doctrine. 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal, Justice Stevens, writing for the 
five justice majority, reached the holding essentially advocated in 
Justice Brandeis' Pennsylvania Coal dissent.286 Like Brandeis, the 
majority of the justices were willing to defer to a legislative deter-
mination that police power regulation was justified and necessary to 
protect public interest. 287 The majority held that the genuine, sub-
stantial, and legitimate public purposes of the Subsidence Act were 
the prevention of the negative health, environmental, and fiscal 
integrity effects of damage caused by surface subsidence coal min-
ing.288 Proceeding with its bundle of rights regulatory takings test, 
the majority rejected the coal companies' taking challenge based on 
two apparently independent conclusions: First, that the government 
action does not have the "character" of a taking; and second, that 
there was no record in the case to support a finding that the Act 
makes it impossible to profitably engage in coal mining, or that there 
has been undue interference with investment backed expectations. 289 
The principal holding of the Court, focusing on the magnitude of 
the economic burden to the indiyi<iual owner's bundle of property 
rights, was reached using the analysis one would expectoased on 
Penn Central and its progeny.290 Justice Stevens began this analysis 
by noting that the case involved a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the act in which the coal companies presented their 
284 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. at 1239. 
285 107 S. Ct. at 1236. The Supreme Court also held that the legislation did not violate the 
contracts clause of the United States Constitution. [d. at 1251-53. 
2B6 See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text. 
287 See 107 S. Ct. at 1242-44. 
288 [d. at 1242-43. 
289 [d. at 1242. See also 107 S. Ct. at 1256 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court today 
indicates that this 'nuisance exception' alone might support its conclusion that no taking has 
occurred."). 
290 Compare 107 S. Ct. at 1246-50; supra text accompanying notes 280-81. 
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takings claim by narro\Vlygefining ce}"tain segments. of their prop-
ertx and arguing that the Subsidence Act takes this "property''-by' 
(femYing the coal company owners any economically viableuse.291 He 
reasoned that one of the ~riti~~LqyestioI1sin __ the a~lllysi~gf the 
magnitude of the. burden to the. jndiyidual Qwner jftJhatof. "de1er.:-
mining how to define the unit of property 'whose value isto fl!rn!§lh 
the denominator oftha -fraetion.'''292 The majority opinion then set 
out two recent Supreme Court verbal formulizations of the defini-
tional issue: 
In Penn Central the Court explained: 'Takings' jurisprudence 
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular gov-
ernmental action has effected a taking, the Court focuses rather 
both on the character of the action and on the nature of the 
interference with rights in-the-p~~~e'l as a whole-here the city 
tax block designated as the landmark site .... Similarly, in An-
drus v. Allard . .. we held that where an owner possesses a full 
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the 
I bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in 
, its entirety. 293 
With these formulizations providing "sufficient guidance," Justice 
Stevens then rejected the two alternative theories by which the coal 
companies asserted their claim. 
First, the majority opinion rejected the coal companies' argument 
that the Act had taken property because it required that approxi-
mately 27 million tons of coal be left in place. 294 Looking to the above 
quoted portions of the Penn Central and Andrus opinions, Justice 
Stevens reasoned that "27 million tons of coal do not constitute a 
separate segment of property for-takings law purposes. "295 Likening 
the Subsidence Act to zoning and set back ordinances which limit an 
owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his prop-
erty, Justice Stevens added: "There is no basis for treating less than 
~% of petitioners' coal as a separate parcei of property. "296 He then-
reasoned "that in the context of any reasonable unifofcoal-making 
291 107 S. Ct. at 1246-48. Justice Stevens noted that the coal companies did not claim that 
bituminous coal mining is now commercially impractical, or unprofitable. Also, there was no 
evidence as to how much coal was actually left in the ground solely due to the Act. [d. at 
1247-48. 
292 [d. at 1248. 
293 107 S. Ct. at 1248 (quoting Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 130-31, and 
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66). 
294 107 S. Ct. at 1249. 
295 [d. 
296 [d. 
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operations and investment backed expectations," the coal companies 
had not sustained their burden of showing that they had been denied 
economically viable use of that property, or that investment backed 
expectations had been materially affected. 297 
The majority had a little more difficulty with the coal companies' 
alternative claim that the Act took their "support estate," a se~arate 
interest in land under Pennsylvania law. 298 On tlleone hand; the 
ma]orifYapparenUY-FierdTha.rstat~!!w<ioes not define "property" 
for purposes of federal constitution takings clause analysis, and that 
Pennsylvania's support estate was not a cognizable property right 
under the takings clause. 299 However, Justice Stevens alternatively 
reasoned that "even if we were to accept petitioners' invitation to 
view the support estate as a dii?ti:Q~t s~gmeD.t of property for 'takings' 
purposes, they have not satisfied their heavy burden of sustaining a 
facial challenge to the Act. "300 
Although the Keystone Bituminous Coal Court's bundle of rights 
analysis raises certain questions which will be crucial to fiiturereg: 
ulatory takings analysis, the most significant aspect of the majority 
opinion is the Court's finding that the Subsidence Act fits within a 
"public nuisance exception" to the takings clause. 30l Justice Stevens, 
reached this holding by reasoning that in Pennsylvania Coal, and 
cases decided both before and after it, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the "nature" of the state's interest in the regulation is 
a critical factor in takings analysis. 302 He further reasoned that the 
nature of the state's interest is a factor which is to be weighed along 
with the "!r2e of taking," that is whether it is a physical invasion 
ora regulatory program, and the magnItude of harm to the individ-
lia1.303 Afterfocusln~fspecifically on Mugler and Miller, Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that courts are hesitant to find a taking when the 
state "merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to 
public nuisances. "304 The majority believed that because the Subsid-
ence Act furthers a substantial public interest in "preventing activ-
297 [d. 
298 [d. at 1250-51. See supra note 153. 
299 [d. at 1250. 
300 [d. Apparently, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility of an "as applied" 
regulatory takings challenge based on support estate property rights. But see supra note 289 
and accompanying text. 
301 107 S. Ct. at 1243-46. 
302 [d. at 1243-45. Justice Stevens explicitly reasoned: "We reject petitioner's implicit as-
sertion that Pennsylvania Coal overruled [the noxious use) cases which focused so heavily 
on the nature of the state's interest in regulation." [d. at 1244. 
30.' [d. at 1244, 1244 n.18. 
304 [d. at 1245. 
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ities similar to public nuisances" it fits within the "public nuisance 
exception" to the takings clause. 305 As a result of falling within this 
classification, the Subsidence Act was found to lack the "character" 
of a taking and the coal companies may be burdened by this police 
power regulation with no claim for just compensation.306 The major-
ity did not elaborate on whether anti-nuisance regulations are never 
a taking, or whether these regulations only require heavier burdens 
on the individual to constitute a taking. 
The majority also reasoned that the special status of public nuis-
ance police power regulations is consistent with Justice Holmes' 
principle of average reciprocity of advantage. 307 Justice Stevens rea-
soned that, with public nuisance restrictions, "[w]hile each of us is 
burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we in turn, benefit greatly 
from the restrictions that are placed on others. "308 In a footnote, 
Justice Stevens added that the takings clause does not require that 
states or the courts calculate whether a specific individual has suf-
fered burdens under this generic rule in excess of benefits re-
ceived. 309 Thus, the Keystone Bituminous Coal majority apparently 
interpreted the principle of average reciprocity of advantage to re-
quire that the nature of a police power regulation be such that, 
though its use may burden an individual on one occasion, other 
similar regulations will generate benefits which outweigh this bur-
den. However, the majority also believed that the principle does not 
require that the benefits outweigh the individual's burden on each 
and every occasion.310 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the dissenters appear to have agreed 
with the structure of the takings analysis laid out by the majority, 
but differed as to the particulars of each arm of the inquiry and as 
to the application of these arms to the coal companies regulatory 
305 See id. at 1242, 1246, 1245 n.20. 
306 I d. at 1246. 
307 In a footnote Justice Stevens also reasoned that the special status was also justified on 
the basis that the state has not "taken" anything when it enjoins a nuisance-like activity 
because no private individual has the right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or 
otherwise harm others. Id. at 1245 n.20. 
308 I d. at 1245. 
309 I d. at 1245 n.21. 
310 This Comment has argued that Justice Holmes' principle of average reciprocity of ad-
vantage did require weighing on each and every occasion, but that it applied only to certain 
police power regulations where such weighing made sense. See supra notes 141-42 and 
accompanying text. The Keystone Bituminous Coal Court, like the Andrus and Agins Courts, 
appears to be attempting to construe average reciprocity of advantage based on Justice 
Brandeis' "quip" on the final page of his Pennsylvania Coal dissent. See supra note 176 and 
accompanying text. 
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takings claim. It is clear the dissenters believed that the Court's 
analysis of the Subsidence Act must follow the Pennsylvania Coal 
Court's analysis of the Kohler Act.3ll The dissent rejected the ma-
jority's characterization of much of the Pennsylvania Coal majority 
opinion as "advisory," and they found a regulatory taking for largely 
the same reasons as Justice Holmes and the majority in the earlier 
case. 
After concluding that the public purposes of the Subsidence Act 
were indistinguishable from those of the Kohler Act, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that the existence of a public purpose does not 
resolve the question of whether a taking has occurred. 312 He agreed 
with the majority that the nature of the public purpose is relevant 
to the analysis of a regulatory takings claim. 313 Expounding upon 
the analysis of his Penn Central dissent, which argued that any 
police power regulation that significantly burdened private property 
was a taking unless it fit within the noxious use exception or gen-
erated an average reciprocity of advantage, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned that a narrow "nuisance exception" to takings analysis has 
been established by the Court's precedent.314 In the view of the 
Chief Justice, the narrow nature of the nuisance exception is com-
pelled by the principles underlying the takings clause. 315 Rehnquist 
further reasoned that the takings clause does not prohibit regulations 
which secure a reciprocity of advantage. 316 Rather, he reasoned that 
it does prohibit the public from unjustly placing public burdens on 
an individual and mandates full and equivalent compensation when 
one surrenders to the public something more and different than 
surrendered by other members of the public.317 Apparently, the 
dissenters believed that average reciprocity of advantage was not 
needed to, and did not operate to, validate public nuisance regula-
tions. 
The dissent reasoned that a broad public nuisance exception to 
the takings clause based on multi-faceted regulations advancing the 
311 107 S. Ct. at 1253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting justices rejecting the 
majority's characterization of much of the Pennsylvania Coal majority opinion as "advisory," 
the dissenting Justices' analysis is in large part an updated version of the reasonableness test 
of Justice Holmes and the Pennsylvania Coal majority. See id. at 1253-59. But see supra 
notes 146-66, 178-80 and accompanying text. 
312 107 S. Ct. at 1256. 
313Id. 
314Id. 
"'5 Id. 
316Id. 
317Id. 
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public purposes of health, welfare and safety would allow the gov-
ernment "much greater authority" to place societal burdens on in-
dividual landowners than the Court has recognized, and thereby 
erode the takings clause guarantee. 318 Thus, the Chief Justice was 
unable to agree with the Court's conclusion that this nuisance ex-
ception encompassed the Subsidence Act. 319 Instead, he argued that 
the majority opinion's assertion that the activity here regulated is 
akin to a public nuisance suggests an exception far wider than rec-
ognized in the Court's previous regulatory takings cases. 320 
Chief Justice Rehnquist then proceeded with an analysis of the 
nature and scope of the nuisance exception in regulatory takings 
analysis. He reasoned that the exception is not coterminous with the 
police power itself. 321 Quoting Curtin v. Benson, the Chief Justice, 
further reasoned that it is a narrow exception which allows the 
government to prevent "a misuse or illegal use" of property, but 
does not allow "the prevention of a legal and essential use, an attri-
bute of the property's ownership. "322 In the dissenters' view, the 
Supreme Court has applied two narrowing principles to the nuisance 
exception. 323 First, the public nuisance regulations exempted from 
the takings clause have rested on discrete and narrow purposes. 324 
Second, the Chief Justice believed it was even more significant that 
the Supreme Court had "never applied the nuisance exception to 
318Id. at 1256-57. 
319 I d. at 1256. 
32°Id. 
321Id. at 1256 (citing Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist J., dissent-
ing)). See supra note 196. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). 
322 Id. at 1256 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)). For a discussion of Curtin 
see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. The Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent's use 
of Curtin in articulating principles applicable to the "public nuisance exception" to the takings 
clause is problematic. The principle issue in Curtin was whether or not the federal government 
had the power to regulate private property adjacent to federal lands at all, not whether the 
specific proposed regulations fell within a public nuisance exception to the takings clause. 
Justice McKenna's opinion indicates that the justices deciding that case did not believe that 
the regulations considered there could be considered to be only regulations of uses of property 
injurious to others. See 222 U.S. at 86. The Curtin opinion does not say that regulations solely 
prohibiting injurious or noxious uses of property cannot destroy all use of property. Nor does 
Curtin say that a use of property found to be noxious can constitute an "essential use of 
private property, an attribute of its ownership .... " Consequently, Curtin does not reflect 
the reality of the broad public nuisance police power recognized in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. See supra Sections lA, & III. 
323 107 S. Ct. at 1257. 
324 Id. The cases cited by the Chief Justice as precedent exhibiting this principle are: Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
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allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property. "325 He 
further reasoned that although the Court has upheld public nuisance 
regulations which substantially reduce the value of an owner's prop-
erty, "we have not accepted the proposition that the State may 
completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without 
providing compensation. "326 
The dissenters found that the Subsidence Act violated both of 
these narrowing principles and thus did not fall within the takings 
clause public nuisance exception. First, the Act was much more than 
a nuisance statute because its central purposes, although including 
public safety, reflect a concern for the preservation of buildings, 
economic development, and the maintainance of property values to 
sustain the state's tax base. 327 The Chief Justice reasoned that the 
Court "should hesitate to allow a regulation based on essentially 
economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth 
Amendment by labeling it a nuisance regulation."328 Under the sec-
ond principle, he reasoned that the Subsidence Act falls outside the 
nuisance exception because it requires seams of coal to remain in 
the ground, and thus it does not merely forbid a particular use of 
the property with many uses but extinguishes all beneficial use of 
the coal companies' property. 329 
The_final sect!o:t:l of the Chief Justice's dissent took issue with the 
!TIajority's holding that the Subsidence Act's impact on the coal 
companies' bundle of rights was constitutionally permissible. 330 In 
the dissenters'''view the majority's conclusion that the Act does not 
325 107 S. Ct. at 1257. As far as regulatory takings precedent involving personal property 
is concerned, the dissent's assertion does not completely reflect precedent. See Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687, 698-99 (1888) (public nuisance police power regulation under 
which the use and sale of plaintiff's validly manufactured oleomargarine without compensation 
upheld); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 139 (1894) (regulation allowing the uncompensated 
appropriation and destruction of certain fishing equipment as a nuisance upheld). See also 
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664 (the Mugler Court rejected the defendants' argument that their 
"[brewing] establishments will become of no value as property, or, at least, will be materially 
diminished in value . . .. "). See infra note 375 for a further discussion of the Keystone 
Bituminous Coal dissent's assertion. 
326 107 S. Ct. at 1257. The dissent discussed Mugler, Goldblatt, and Miller v. Schoene, 276 
U.S. 272 (1928) as precedent resting on a rejection of this proposition. Again, contrary to the 
dissent's assertion, much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence does accept the proposition. 
See supra notes 75, 325; infra note 375. 
327 107 S. Ct. at 1257. 
328Id. But see supra note 208 and accompanying text (characterizing Miller v. Schoene as 
reasoning that public nuisance regulation could be used to protect public interest economic 
concerns). 
329 107 S. Ct. at 1257. 
33°Id. at 1258-61. 
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impermissibly impair the coal companies' investment backed expec-
tations or ability to profitably operate their businesses was primarily 
\ a result of its view that 27 million tons of coal in the ground ,<l9_Jwt. 
: ~onstitute a separate segment of propE:)t:ty for takings law pur-
• poses. 331 The dissenters argued that the majority only reached this 
· conclusion by basirig its consl<leration of the impact on private prop-
erty rights on the fact that the alleged taking was regulatory rather, 
than a ,physical intrusion. 332 The dissenters believed that the char-
acterization of the government action as a regulatory or physical 
invasion was, in itself, irrelevant to measuring the burden on private 
· property. The Chief Justice reasoned that the Court's precedent 
accorded the two types of government action different treatment 
only because it is clear that physical appropriations, unlike regula-
tions, deprive the owner of the full bundle of property rights in 
land. 333 
In the <;lissenter's view the Subsidence Act destroyed the entire 
bundle of interests in a segment of property, the 27 million tons of 
coal, and thus works a taking of property.334 Apparently, at least in 
these circumstances, the dissenters believed that the Court should 
not look at the impact of regulation on the regulated owner'sentlreJ 
related business property interests. 335 Rather, they would hold that 
the specific unusable segment of property was taken. 336 
Similarly, the Chief Justice rejected the majority's refusal to con-
sider the impact on the support estate as the relevant segment of 
property.337 He reasoned that the Court has evaluated takings claims 
by reference to units of property defined by state law,.' and that 
Pennsylvania has clearly defined the support estate as a separate 
estate in property. Thus, the Chief Justice and the dissenters be-
lieved that it is appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on 
only the bundle of rights inuring to the support estate, rather than 
to treat this estate as merely part of the bundle of rights possessed 
"'1 I d. at 1258. 
332 Id. 
333 I d. at 1258-59. The Chief Justice specifically reasoned that the Court's decision in Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), would have been different if the government confiscated the 
avian artifacts, rather than prohibiting only their sale and thereby destroying only one strand 
of the owner's bundle of property rights. 107 S. Ct. at 1259. See supra notes 248-54 and 
accompanying text. 
334 107 S. Ct. at 1259. 
335Id. 
336 See id. 
337Id. at 1259-61. 
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by either the coal owner or the surface owner.338 So considered, the 
dissenters believed the Act must be accompanied by just compen-
sation because it completely interferes with a property right and 
extinguishes its value, making worthless the separate right the coal 
company purchased under Pennsylvania law. 339 
Thus, Keystone Bituminous Coal contains several potentially im-
portant developments for the Supreme Court's regulatory takings 
analysis. Generally, the Rehnquist Court continued to embrace the 
Burger Court's regulatory takings test which first examines whether 
a regulation advances a public purpose, then weighs the magnitude 
of the burden to the owner's bundle _QfE:r:QP.e.!:~l_~ig:h~~. However, in 
Keystone Bituminous Coal, ,~ __ ~~!i~Y-~Lthe justices have now 
~dica!~_that_ ~~at~ _p~opert;~}Gl"Y. .. goe.s .. Jlot define-t1ie'srz~-()!Jhe 
:'bundle'~~.J.:l.s.!qered in the Court'8regulGl~~ry takings analysis,. and. 
that an assessment or a regulatloii's economic interference must take 
into account the owner's overall business interests. 34o The four Key-
stone Bituminous Coal dissenters believed that the Pennsylvania 
Coal Court had held otherwise. 
The Keystone Bituminous Coal opinion's most significant aspect 
is its refinement of the prong of the Court's regulatory takings 
analysis which measures the burden to the individual in terms of 
"the character of the taking." The Court held that "the character of 
the taking" is determined by the "type of taking" and "the nature of 
the State's action. "341 The "type of taking" primarily refers to 
whether the government interference with private property is in the 
form of a physical invasion, or police power regulation. However, it 
also apparently includes the breadth of the class of burdened owners, 
and the types of property interests taken by the invasion. 342 The 
"nature of the State's action" aspect of this prong focuses on whether 
the state is prohibiting a noxious use, and thus acting within the 
public nuisance exception to the takings clause.343 Unfortunately, the 
Keystone Bituminous Coal majority did not develop the nature and 
meaning of the exception, although the dissent argued that it is a 
very limited one. 
338 See id. 
339 I d. at 1260-6l. 
340 See supra notes 295-300 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra notes 301-06 and accompanying text. 
342 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
343 See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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V. WHY THE SUPREME COURT'S REGULATORY TAKINGS TEST IS 
ON THE WRONG TRACK, AND A SUGGESTED MODIFICATION 
A. Why the Regulatory Takings Test Has Been on the Wrong 
Track After Penn Central: The Need to Balance Harm to the 
Individual Against Harm to the Public Interest. 
The Supreme Court and commentators agree that the takings 
clause should be construed as a principle mandating fairness in gov-
ernment interference with private property.344 This "fairness" man-
dates that no government action, either taxation, eminent domain, 
or police power is constitutional if its sole purpose is to redistribute 
to individuals the private benefits of the government action. 345 As 
applied to police power regulations, the fairness required by the 
takings clause is principally a requirement that the purpose or effect 
of the regulation must not be to redistribute unreasonably an indi-
vidual's private property rights to society at large. 346 Thus, the Court 
has sought generally to prohibit the use of the police power to avoid 
the just compensation requirement of the fifth amendment. While 
the Supreme Court's modern regulatory takings test may be ade-
quate to accomplish this goal, the Court's evolving test has yet to 
produce reasoning and results which convey an underlying consis-
tency, or the "fairness" which is the purported goal of regulatory 
takings analysis. 
Much of the continuing inconsistency is a result of the Supreme 
Court's failure to comprehend, or at least articulate, the meaning 
and importance of the principles of "noxious use" and "average re-
ciprocity of advantage" within the precedent on which the Court 
continues to base its regulatory takings analysis. Pennsylvania Coal 
did not establish that every police power regulation must provide 
an average reciprocity of advantage. 347 The Rehnquist Court must 
limit its use of this principle to the manner in which Justice Holmes 
used it. Average reciprocity of advantage is appropriate in a narrow 
type of regulatory takings case involving mutual development 
schemes with direct transfers of private property interests among 
344 See Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 124; Michelman, supra note 3. 
345 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 165-66 (1985). 
346 See id. at 166; Michelman, supra note 3, at 1203-45. Aside from Loretto, the Court only 
has struck down police power regulations with the takings clause when it perceived the 
regulation to be a spot redistribution of wealth. See L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 167-69. See 
also Note, Governmental Seizure of a Business To Prevent Strike Caused Work Stoppages-
Regulation or Taking?, 49 GEO. WASH. L. RE;'. 184, 192-93 (1950). 
347 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. . 
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private individuals, but is completely irrelevant to the vast majority 
of takings challenges to police power regulations. 348 
Similarly, the regulatory takings analysis developed by the Burger 
Court has been on the wrong track because it incorrectly ignored 
the principles of the noxious use cases, and tested the constitution-
ality of police power regulations solely by analyzing the magnitude 
of the burden to the owner's bundle of property rights. 349 The Court 
has used its bundle of rights analysis as if it was the entire regulatory 
takings test, when it is properly viewed as merely a part of the 
analysis used by the Court in precedent. 35o As a result, the Court 
has manipulated the bundle of rights analysis to achieve the correct 
results at the expense of the logic and consistency of the analysis. 351 
It is difficult to understand why, in Penn Central, New York's 
landmark law forbidding the owner's multimillion dollar development 
of property in the manner of his neighbors and, in Andrus, the 
Secretary of the Interior's regulations forbidding the owner's right 
to sell his rare bird artifacts take a constitutionally permissible 
amount of property interests out of the owner's bundle when, in 
Loretto, the New York cable-television regulation forcing owners 
who choose to rent their property to accept, for "a reasonable fee," 
a few cables and a one and one-half foot by one foot rooftop box on 
their building, takes too many.352 The reasoning of the Keystone 
Bituminous Coal majority that federal law and the owner's overall 
business operations control the determination of the relevant seg-
ment of property in which an owner can claim a bundle of rights is 
348 See supra Section IC. 
349 See supra Section IVA. 
350 See supra notes 93-107, 143-80 and accompanying text. 
35l As the Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent points out, it is inconsistent to measure the 
individual burden in the context of the individual's overall business interests where the alleged 
taking is by regulation, but to measure the individual burden against the specific property 
interest where the government action is, or authorizes, a physical invasion. See 107 S. Ct. at 
1258. Additionally, if there is a qualitative difference between regulation of public nuisance 
activities and other uses of the police power (as the Keystone Bituminous Coal Court sug-
gested), why has the Court used the significant burdens allowed in public nuisance regulation 
cases to establish limits (or lack thereof) on non-public nuisance related government interfer-
ence with private property? See Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 127-29, 130-31, 
133-35. 
352 See L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 177-79. On the other hand, it is easier to understand 
that the use of the police power regulation in Loretto was struck down because it did violate 
certain traditional, compatible, and noninjurious property interests only to speed up the 
already occurring cable television installation process, while the Penn Central Transportation 
and Andrus regulations were necessary to prevent property uses which would result in 
significant and permanent losses to the environment. For an analysis attempting to capture 
this totality of the circumstances type balancing see infra Section VB. 
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also troubling.353 This reasoning suggests that federal courts must 
disregard state law property interests and determine the regulated 
parcel on which the harm to the owner's bundle of rights is to be 
measured. Such an approach necessarily implies that the larger the 
regulated owner's overall property interest the less likely a taking 
will be found. This approach contradicts the recognized anti-redis-
tributive principle represented by the takings clause. 354 
Legitimate exercises of the police power operate to define what 
private property rights are, rather than to take them for public use 
in the sense which the takings clause contemplated.355 The power to 
determine the legal uses of private property, more particularly to 
prevent uses which threaten the public health and safety, has been 
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty for a period dating 
back beyond the date of enactment of the United States and state 
constitutions. However, at least until Keystone Bituminous Coal, 
the Court's modern approach presupposed that the takings clause, 
through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess clause, constituted a substantive limitation on any and all uses 
of the police power. The Burger Court seemed to be interpreting 
the takings clause as carving out an autonomous area of private 
property in which government cannot regulate without compensa-
tion. 356 In so doing, the Court had departed from the noxious use 
cases which upheld states' absolute police power to prohibit public 
nuisances. 357 Thus, under the Burger Court, the takings clause was 
not only a principle mandating fairness, but rather a bar to state 
police power. 
The recognition of an important role for states' police power to 
arbitrate among land uses is integral to the vitality of a regulatory 
takings analysis which contains a bundle of rights component. Most 
modern redefinitions of private property rights are based on new 
interdependencies of neighboring uses and changing public percep-
tions of what constitutes "private property," rather than on any 
desire to tyrannize or redistribute property.358 The Burger Court's 
approach protecting an eighteenth or nineteenth century bundle of 
rights of property owners ignored the realities of property rights. 
353 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. at 1249-50. 
354 See supra note 133. 
355 See supra note 4. See also Sax, supra note 218, at 484-96. 
356 L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 174-75. 
357 See supra Section lA. 
358 Sax, supra note 218, at 484-96. See also Sax l, supra note 3, at 61; Sax II, supra note 
3. 
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Property is a dynamic concept not a static bundle of rights. The 
recognition that property is a dynamic concept underlay the Supreme 
Court's acceptance of zoning as a constitutional use of the police 
power in the context of a regulatory takings claim sixty years ago. 359 
Once the dynamic nature of property rights is realized, it becomes 
evident that the constitutionality of a property use regulation de-
mands a flexible test which examines the necessity and reasonable-
ness of the regulation in its social environment. Regulatory takings 
claims must be decided by balancing the harm to the individual 
against the purpose and necessity of the regulation. 360 Supreme 
Court precedent recognizes that such a decision is best made by 
localized experts whose judgment should be deferred to unless the 
use of the police power is clearly unreasonable or intentionally re-
distributive. 361 The Court's modern bundle of rights balancing test 
necessarily, and incorrectly, focuses the constitutional analysis of 
police power redefinitions of property rights on one factor-the harm 
to the burdened owner's traditional property interests. It does not 
weigh the purpose of the regulation against the burden it creates. 
All the justices appear to have realized this in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal, but the Court has not yet explicitly related the nature and 
necessity of the police power action ~o the burden it creates. This 
Comment has argued that all of the l Court's earlier precedent un-
dertook this weighing. 362 
359 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88. See also Bettman, supra note 182, at 187. 
360 Justice Stevens expressly recognizes this in his Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. opinion. 
107 S. Ct. at 1246. However, this Comment suggests that, at least until Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn., such balancing did not fit within the framework of the Supreme Court's modern 
regulatory taking analysis. See supra Section IVA. Several commentators have reached the 
conclusion that the regulatory takings test should balance public necessity against private 
harm. See Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 
52 TEXAS L. REV. 201, 228-36, 243-53 (1974); Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity 
of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative To Takings 
Analysis, 57 U. WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982). See also Comment, Balancing Private Loss 
Against Public Gain to Test For a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just 
Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315 (1979). Justice Black argued that such balancing was 
not consistent with the takings clause. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N. Y. U. L. REV. 865, 
877-79 (1960). 
361 See, e.g., Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89, 395; Pennsylvania 
Coal, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis J., dissenting); Block, 256 U.S. at 158. 
362 See supra Section I. However, this Comment does not argue that the relaxed requirement 
of a "real and substantial relation" to a proper public purpose of public nuisance abatement 
or zoning constitutes the proper balancing standard for modern regulatory takings analyses. 
Given the greater constitutional protection given to many individual rights by the modern 
Supreme Court, a least restrictive means analysis may be more appropriate where police 
power regulations substantially burden private property. 
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The Keystone Bituminous Coal Court's recognition of a takings 
clause exception encompassing a state's police power to prevent 
noxious uses is a step toward getting the regulatory takings analysis 
back on track. The Court's precedents do establish that the "nature" 
of the police power regulation is important for takings clause pur-
poses. Yet the Keystone Bituminous Coal Court failed to appreciate, 
or at least articulate, the scope or meaning of the public nuisance 
exception. Justice Stevens' limited articulation of state's right to 
prohibit uses similar to nuisances has destined the Court's regulatory 
takings litigation to a new battleground-that of the scope of the 
"public nuisance exception." His implicit reasoning that this excep-
tion may be absolute363 will further exacerbate the conflict. How will 
courts distinguish between public nuisance regulations and amend-
ments to zoning regulations designed to protect the integrity of the 
zoned community? Similarly, are not environmental protection stat-
utes which protect public and private property interests from spil-
lover effects of economic uses of property public nuisance regula-
tions?364 A predictable response by pro-environment lawmakers will 
be to characterize environmental protection statutes as public nuis-
ance statutes. 
Contrary to the Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent, this Comment 
has argued that the Court's precedent does not establish a narrow 
"public nuisance exception. "365 One key to understanding the scope 
of what the Rehnquist Court is now characterizing as the "public 
nuisance exception" to the takings clause is to relate the public 
363 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. at 1243 n.17 ("In his [Pennsylvania 
Coall dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the State has an absolute right to prohibit land 
use that amounts to a public nuisance ... Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court did not 
contest that proposition, but instead took issue with Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the 
Kohler Act represented such a prohibition."). This Comment has argued that the "public 
nuisance exception" was absolute. See supra notes 73-75, 165 and accompanying text. 
364 In connection with this latter question it should be noted that the principal difference 
between the Kohler Act, which the Pennsylvania Coal Court rejected as a public nuisance 
regulation, and the Subsidence Act, which the Keystone Bituminous Coal Court accepted as 
one, is that the "main goal" of the Subsidence Act was deterring coal operators from causing 
damage to surface land areas. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. at 1243. Thus, 
the Subsidence Act is largely a "conservation" or environmental protection statute, unlike the 
Kohler Act. See id. at 1242-43. Professor Joseph Sax has argued that the government should 
be able to prevent all "spillover effects," that is, economic uses which affect other public or 
private property, unfettered by the takings clause. See Sax II, supra note 3, at 161-63. But 
see Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 170-77 (1985), aff'd in vart. vac'd 
in part, remanded, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Cert. denied, 193 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1987) (U.S. 
Court of Claims Chief Judge Kozinski distinguished between public nuisance and environmen-
tal protection statutes, reasoning that the former can burden individuals to a greater extent 
than the latter). See also supra note 197. 
365 See supra Sections IA & III. 
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nuisance (i.e. noxious use) cases to the Court's decisions in Penn-
sylvania Coal and Euclid. 366 The modern Supreme Court has not 
completely understood the relationship of these earlier precedents 
because it has failed to understand the role of average reciprocity of 
advantage in these two cases. In the dissent in Penn Central, both 
the current Chief Justice and Justice Stevens viewed the principle 
of average reciprocity of advantage as underlying the Supreme 
Court's acceptance of zoning as a "constitutional exercise of police 
power in Euclid. 367 Examining the reasoning of Pennsylvania Coal, 
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., and those cases which Justice Holmes 
characterized as resting on the principle, this Comment has argued 
that the principle of average reciprocity of advantage operated in 
Supreme Court doctrine only as a validator of uncompensated police 
power regulations in a narrow context-where in mutual development 
schemes direct transfers of property interests occurred between 
identifiable owners.368 These types of police power exercises gener-
ated both general benefits shared by the public as well as the bur-
dened owners, and special benefits shared only by the burdened 
owners.369 It is not average reciprocity of advantage which justified 
the police power to zone in Euclid,rather the constitutionality of 
zoning rests on the Euclid Court's recognition that the police power 
to prevent public nuisances is "not coterminous with the police power 
itself," and that zoning was akin to, or justified for, the same reasons 
as, the police power to prevent public nuisances. 37o In other words, 
just as earlier Courts had found that the the police power to prevent 
use which amounts to common law public nuisances properly ex-
tended to preventing near-nuisances, the Euclid Court found that 
prohibiting public nuisances from developing by means of zoning also 
366 See supra Sections II & III. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, despite their 
divergent opinions in Keystone Bituminous Coal, are apparently the only two Justices sitting 
on both the Penn Central and Keystone Bituminous Coal Courts who have espoused a 
regulatory taking analysis which includes a "noxious use" or "public nuisance" exception in 
both cases. See Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978) (in the Opinion 
of the Court, Justice Brennan reasons: "[Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt] are better under-
stood as resting not on any supposed "noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but rather on 
the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy, 
not unlike historic preservation, expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable 
to all similarly situated property."). Yet, Keystone Bituminous Coal indicates that all the 
Supreme Court justices are now embracing the view of regulatory takings doctrine articulated 
by the Penn Central dissent. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text. 
367 438 U.S. at 139-40, 147 (J. Rehnquist dissenting). 
36B See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text. 
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fell within the proper use of the police power that the Rehnquist 
Court is now characterizing as "the public nuisance exception" to 
the takings clause. Further, Miller v. Schoene additionally upheld a 
"public nuisance exception" to the takings clause which recognized 
that if a proper public purpose exists, the state may directly arbi-
trate among competing property uses using the police power to 
prevent nuisances. 371 
In addition, this Comment has argued that the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in the pre-1930 noxious use or public nuisance cases does 
not support the limiting principles to the exception advanced by the 
Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent. 372 Contrary to the Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal dissent's suggestion, at least by the second two 
decades of the twentieth century the Supreme Court did not reason 
that police power regulation must rest on discrete and narrow health 
and safety purposes, and not essentially economic concerns, to fall 
within the public nuisance exception. 373 Miller v. Schoene clearly 
establishes that prohibition of adverse economic effects on private 
property which indirectly affect the public welfare can be the pur-
pose of public nuisance regulation. 374 Nor has the Court reasoned 
that the public nuisance exception cannot be applied to allow com-
plete extinction of the value of a parcel of property.375 Correctly 
371 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text. 
372 107 S. Ct. at 1257 (C.J. Rehnquist dissenting). See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying 
text. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent does not state that the Supreme Court's reasoning has 
ever explicitly recognized these principles. Rather, he finds them to be "involved" in the 
"nuisance rationale" and the results of the regulatory taking cases upholding public nuisance 
regulation of private property. 
373 The Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent implicitly suggests that the discrete and narrow 
purposes of public nuisance statutes are the protection of public health and safety. See Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. at 1257 (C.J. Rehnquist dissenting). 
374 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
375 The Supreme Court has applied this exception to completely extinguish the value of 
personal property. See supra note 325. In addition, the Supreme Court has never reasoned 
that real and personal property should be treated differently under the takings clause. See 
supra note 45. 
As precedent for its proposition that the Supreme Court has not accepted the proposition 
that the state may completely extinguish a property interest without compensation under 
public nuisance regulations, the Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent first cites Mugler v. 
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (reasoning "in Mugler v. Kansas ... the prohibition of manufac-
ture and sale of intoxicating liquors made the distiller's brewery 'of little value' but did not 
completely extinguish the value of the building." 107 S. Ct. at 1257). But, in Mugler, the 
Court rejected the defendants' argument that their" ... [brewing] establishments will become 
of no value as property, or, at least, will be materially diminished in value .... " 123 U.S. at 
664. The fact that the brewery may have retained some value does not appear to have been 
addressed in the Court's reasoning. It certainly was not determinative. What was important 
was the fact that the building may have some non-noxious use and thus could not be completely 
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viewed, the Supreme Court's public nuisance and noxious use deci-
sions, as well as Euclid and the zoning decisions, establish the 
converse proposition that state governments have the absolute 
power to prevent private property exploitation which is injurious to 
community interest as long as it does not do so arbitrarily or unne-
cessarily.376 
Rather than a narrow "public nuisance exception" to the takings 
clause, the Court's precedent establishes what could be termed a 
broad state police power "use arbitration exception" resting on the 
principle of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment of the 
United States Constitution.377 Recognizing this broad exception, the 
Supreme Court in zoning and public nuisance cases effectuated the 
takings clause guarantee using only the Lawton ends-means sub-
stantive due process test which required only that the ordinance be 
reasonably related to a proper public purpose. 378 The "public nuis-
ance exception" quite simply does not fit within the modern Supreme 
Court's bundle of rights analysis which determines a taking by look-
ing only at the burden to the individual. The fact that, when properly 
destroyed unless specifically found to be a noxious use after passage of the statutes. See id. 
at 670-72, 676-78. In addition, the regulation probably completely destroyed the value of at 
least some of the defendents' brewing equipment since the brewery could no longer be 
profitably operated. See id. at 664. The Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent next cites Miller 
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (reasoning, "Similarly, in Miller v. Schoene ... the individpal 
forced to cut down his cedar trees nevertheless was able 'to use the felled trees.'" 107 S. Ct. 
at 1257). However, again this fact was important only because it established that the Virginia 
statute did not go beyond eliminating a public nuisance (since the felled trees were no longer 
public nuisances), and thus it was a bona fide police power public nuisance regulation. See 
supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text; and supra note 65. Other than for this purpose, 
the Miller Court's reference to the use of the felled trees does not appear to be integral to, 
or representative of, its reasoning upholding Virginia's statute as a valid public nuisance police 
power statute. See 276 U.S. at 277, 278-80. Finally, the Keystone Bituminous Coal dissent 
cites Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (reasoning that "[tlhe restriction on surface 
mining in Goldblatt v. Hempstead ... may have prohibited 'a beneficial use' of the property, 
but did not reduce the value of the lot in question." 107 S. Ct. at 1257). Rather than establishing 
that the nuisance exception cannot completely extinguish the value of property, Goldblatt 
rests on the fact the plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the diminution in value of the 
property and the Court's finding that the local public nuisance regulation was reasonable in 
order to protect public safety. See 369 U.S. at 594. 
376 See supra notes 73-75, 210 and accompanying text. See also Mugler, 123 U.S. at 678 
(Field J., dissenting) ("It has heretofore been supposed to be an established priniciple, that 
where there is a power to abate a nuisance, the abatement must be limited by its necessity, 
and no wanton or unnecessary injury can be committed to the property or rights of the 
individual. "). 
377 The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
378 See supra notes 73-75, 199-201 and accompanying text. 
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viewed, this exception encompasses zoning and most government 
police power arbitration between competing land uses suggests that 
the Court's current "bundle of rights" takings analysis is unsatisfac-
tory. 
B. A Suggested Modijicatio~Use o/the Modern Contract Clause 
Balancing Test. 
The Supreme Court's regulatory takings test must reflect the 
weighing of principles which underlies a takings clause challenge to 
a police power regulation. The United States Constitution clearly 
recognizes that both the federal and state governments have certain 
powers of sovereignty. However, as the Court has held the anti-
redistributive principle embodied in the takings clause must limit 
states' police powers and the federal government's delegated powers 
or "private property disappears."379 These principles mandate a bal-
ancing test which will take into account not only the burden placed 
upon the individual by the regulation, but also the harm to the public 
interest legitimately addressed by the police power. If the Supreme 
Court is to apply one analysis for all types of regulatory takings 
claims, that analysis should be more akin to the Lawton ends-means 
substantive due process regUlatory takings analysis than the bundle 
of rights approach used in eminent domain cases. 380 Rather than 
focusing on detailed analyses of legal fictions such as "noxious use," 
"average reciprocity of advantage," and property owner's "bundle 
of rights," the analysis should recognize the principles consistently 
underlying Supreme Court precedent: Necessary police power reg-
ulations or regulations which impose reasonable burdens on owners 
are not prohibited by the takings clause. Like the Supreme Court's 
tests of the police power when it conflicts with most other explicit 
and fundamental substantive constitutional rights, the Court's reg-
ulatory takings analysis should be a hybrid substantive due process 
analysis which explicitly balances the public interest in regulation 
against the harm to the individual. 381 
379 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
380 See Oakes, supra note 216, at 625-26. 
381 The Supreme Court's constitutional tests under the first amendment freedom of speech 
and free exercise of religion clauses, the contracts clause, and the fundamental right of privacy 
are all hybrid ends-means substantive due process balancing tests. See Roe v. Wade, 4lO U.S. 
113,152-66 (1973) (privacy); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-36 (1972) (first amendment 
free exercise of religion); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500-40 (1981) (first 
amendment freedom of speech); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 4lO-13 (1983) (contract clause). 
.. 
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The Supreme Court's modern formulation of the constitutional 
contract clause analysis offers a workable balancing approach from 
which the Court should draw. During the formative years of its 
modern approaches, the Supreme Court's treatment of claims in-
volving conflicts between the police power and the contract clause 
to a great extent paralleled its treatment of regulatory takings. 382 
Both types of constitutional inquiry center around the private au-
tonomy and the "rule-of-law" underpinnings of the United States 
Constitution. 383 The contract clause, which was originally intended 
by the framers to apply to states, should not mandate a balancing 
test which allows greater state police power interference with indi-
vidual rights than the takings clause analysis . 
The Burger Court is perceived as having rejuvenated the contract 
clause as a source of constitutionally guaranteed substantive individ-
ual rights which may not be abridged by state police power.384 How-
ever, the Burger Court did not strictly construe the contract clause 
as barring any police power interference with private contracts. 385 
Instead, it attempted to insure that police power regulation in this 
area be reasonable, necessary and consistent with the principle em-
bodied in the clause. 386 Although both courts and commentators have 
seen the Burger Court's contract clause analysis as a modification of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, for the most part the 
382 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 165-87. Compare the analysis of the two 
cases on which the Court's modern takings clause and contract clause approaches are based, 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398, 428, 436-48 (1934). In Pennsylvania Coal Justice Holmes used one analysis to 
address both the takings clause and the contract clause claims. See Frankfurter, Twenty Years 
of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opinions, 36 HARV. L. REV. 909, 937 (1923) (classifying 
Pennsylvania Coal as a contract clause case). 
383 See Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414, 1423--31 (1984) 
and cases cited therein. As to the takings clause see L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 165-76. 
Fredrich Hayek set out the rule-of-law ideal of government acting through "rules fixed and 
announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual 
affairs on the basis of this knowledge." F. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 72 (rev. ed. 1976). 
Under an approach based on the rule of law, substantive limitations are not placed on legis-
latures, but legislatures may only impair substantive contract or property rights thr,ough 
generally applicable laws prescribing rules of conduct that operate prospectively. See Note, 
Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. at 1426-27. See also Note, Regulation 
Without Just Compensation: A Political Process-Based Taking Analysis of the Surface Min-
ing Act, 69 GEO. L.J. 1083 (1981), for an argument that a "political process approach," under 
which courts first look to the breadth of the regulation, and then to the degree of interference 
with private property, should be used for takings analysis. 
384 See Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 383, at 1414-15 (1984). 
385 See id. at 1418-19. 
386 [d. at 1427--31. 
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Court's new contract clause decisions are favorably viewed in terms 
of constitutional principles. 387 
Much like its recent takings clause jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions involving the contract clause reveal a fact 
oriented, multi-factor balancing test. 388 In order to determine 
whether a contract has been "impaired" within the meaning of the 
clause, the Court has looked at the legislation's frustration of rea-
sonable contract-based expectations. 389 The degree of investment-
backed interests, and extent of prior legislative regulation in the 
area are two important factors in this inquiry.390 Once an impairment 
of a contract is found, the Court has applied a balancing test which 
draws heavily from ends-means substantive due process analysis. 391 
In its recent contract clause jurisprudence, the Court's level of 
scrutiny of a challenged police power regulation varies inversely with 
the severity of impairment. 392 A police power regulation whose sole 
effect is an impairment of a valid public contract receives strict 
scrutiny and will be upheld only if "reasonable and necessary" to 
serve an "important public purpose. "393 The Supreme Court has also 
suggested that in this situation contractual impairment is "reason-
able" only when it is prompted by some unforeseen changed circum-
stances, and "necessary" only when it is the least drastic means to 
a given end. 394 Where the sole effect of the police power regulation 
is a sudden and permanent impairment of a private contractual 
387Id. at 1426-27, 1429--31. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 345, at 179-87 (Professor Tribe 
argues that the Burger Court's contract clause analysis has been too rigid in its protection of 
existing capital distributions and has failed to protect the vast majority of Americans unable 
to secure economic and emotional security in the marketplace); Epstein, Toward a Revitali-
zation of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 750 (1984) (Professor Epstein argues 
for a stricter contracts clause guarantee and not simply a hybrid substantive due process 
approach). 
388 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Allied Structural Steel 
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
459 U.S. 400 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Keystone Bituminous 
Coal v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1251-53. 
389 See Energy Reserves Group Inc., 459 U.S. at 411, 416. 
390 See id. at 411, 413-16. 
391 See Epstein, supra note 387, at 750 (concluding his argument for a revitalization of the 
contract clause as a source of substantive rights against legislative interference, Professor 
Epstein writes: "The interpretation of the Contract Clause prevailing in the Supreme Court 
reduces the Clause to yet another emaciated form of substantive due process."). 
392 Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 411; Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 
438 U. S. at 245. 
398 Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 245; United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25 
(1977). 
394 Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 383, at 1429. See United States 
Trust Co., 341 U.S. at 29-32. 
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obligation, the Court has also applied a strict scrutiny approach 
which compares the degree of disruption of the private contract-
based expectations to the importance of the public ends furthered 
by the challenged police power regulation. 395 Such a balance neces-
sarily accents the narrowness of the classes benefitted and burdened 
by the regulation. 396 Finally, the Court has indicated that a defer-
ential minimum rationality standard of review will apply where the 
police power regulation imposes a "generally applicable rule of con-
duct designed to advance a broad societal interest and only inciden-
tally disrupts existing contractual obligations. "397 
The balancing test which the Court undertakes under the contract 
clause can be used for regulatory takings claims to alternatively 
stress substantive individual rights and a rule of law approach398-
the two theoretical bases underlying both the Lawton ends-means 
substantive due process and the Block/Pennsylvania Coal "reason-
ableness" or "bundle of rights" balancing tests. Under such a bal-
ancing test the Court's initial inquiry would concentrate on the mag-
nitude of the harm to the private individual owner. Weighing the 
"type" of the invasion (authorized physical invasion or restriction of 
use), the diminution in value, and the interference with distinct and 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, the Court would decide 
whether private property has been "taken. "399 If the Court so finds, 
then it will require justification on the part of the state for regulating 
without just compensation. 
State justification would be reviewed with a sliding scale of scru-
tiny. Following the modern contract clause analysis, the Supreme 
Court should link the level of scrutiny to the magnitude of the burden 
to the owner.400 Precedent indicates that the Court should undertake 
strict scrutiny of any regulation which involves the direct transfer 
of property interests to the local, state, or federal government. 401 
395 Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 383, at 1417. 
396 See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. at 190-94 (1983). 
397Id. at 191 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 249). 
398 See Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 383, at 1423-31. 
399 In other words, the Supreme Court should first undertake the Burger Court's bundle of 
rights analysis to determine whether the burden to the property owner rises to the level of a 
"taking." See supra text accompanying notes 280-81. 
400 In Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 395-96 the Court reasoned that its analysis of the reasonableness 
of a regulation would depend on the burden to the individual. But see supra note 73. 
401 In his 1960 article, Professor Joseph Sax concluded that the proper regulatory taking 
test (and not only the level of scrutiny), based on Supreme Court precedent and the policy 
underlying the takings clause was an enterprise-arbiter test which looked to whether or not 
the state was acting to acquire private property interests rather than merely refereeing 
among private property disputes. See Sax I, supra note 2 at 61-76. 
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Such a regulation should be upheld only if it is "reasonable and 
necessary" to advance an important government interest. The av-
erage reciprocity of advantage line of cases indicates that mutual 
cooperation schemes mandating direct transfers of substantial pri-
vate property interests among private owners will be upheld as 
reasonable only if they convey roughly reciprocal benefits on the 
burdened owners. 402 Loretto indicates that a police power regulation 
allowing permanent physical occupation of private property is un-
reasonable. 403 Of course, the bulk of regulatory takings claims arise 
in the context of government arbitration of private property inter-
ests. Regulatory takings precedent readily indicates that use arbi-
tration regulation, such as zoning and noxious use ordinances, which 
advance broad societal interests with generally applicable rules of 
conduct will receive more deferential scrutiny even if they substan-
tially burden individual interests. 404 Keystone Bituminous Coal, as 
well as the older noxious use cases, indicate that legitimate regula-
tion of spillover uses of private property which will harm bona fide 
public interests is reasonable and necessary. In other words, as long 
as the state does not arbitrarily or unreasonably regulate private 
property, the state interest in regulation will outweigh any private 
property interests. 405 
Clearly, this proposed analysis will not immediately provide bright 
guidelines for land use regulators and private property owners, but 
it should provide the predictability and guidance as to the constitu-
tional protection of private property that all desire. This test ex-
pressly lays out all the factors which go into the ad hoc factual inquiry 
and relates them in a meaningful way. It balances the harm to the 
individual against the public interest by requiring stricter scrutiny 
of regulations which substantially burden private property interests. 
The analysis also makes clear that both the nature and the necessity 
of the ends of the regulation do affect the Court's analysis of the 
means, that is of the burden placed on the individual. It links the 
modern Court's regulatory takings analysis to its older substantive 
due process analysis, and allows the Court to expand upon its prec-
edent in the context of new types of land use regulation. Most 
importantly, by stressing the necessity of police power action in 
402 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
403 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
404 See supra Sections IA & III. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1243 
n.16. 
405 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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addition to impact on the owner's bundle of property rights, this 
analysis upholds the core substantive guarantee of the takings clause 
while preserving the state governments' power to undertake rea-
sonable and necessary police power action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a regulatory takings analysis the fifth amendment takings 
clause must be construed as a principle to be balanced against the 
sovereign powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. 
This Comment has argued that in the 1870-1930 period the Supreme 
Court undertook this balancing using three different analyses. Up 
until Keystone Bituminous Coal, the modern Supreme Court had 
relied on a bundle of rights regulatory takings analysis which essen-
tially treats regulatory takings claims in the same manner as non-
regulatory inverse condemnation claims. Although Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal indicates that the Court does now recognize a "public 
nuisance exception" to the takings clause, this Comment has argued 
that both in terms of policy and precedent the modern Supreme 
Court analysis is unsatisfactory because it does not balance the 
purpose of the regulation or its necessity against the magnitude of 
the harm to the individual. Finally, this Comment has suggested 
that a regulatory takings analysis based on the Court's modern 
approach to contract clause cases would contain this requisite bal-
ancing element and could be used to reconcile precedent and uphold 
the underlying goals of the takings clause while preserving states' 
sovereign powers. 
